Arthur Chernkoff, an Australian blogger who writes Chernkoff had a piece published today in the WSJ on-line "Opinion Journal" subtitled "A Roundup of the Past Two Weeks' Good News from Iraq." He notes that readers of the New York Times -- and other major media (other than the WSJ, of course) -- must have felt like they had "gone through a time-warp" when they opened their papers Sunday (and again today, he might have added) to read accounts of the Iraqi elections. He's right. I did. As the elections demonstrate, there are a lot of good things happening in Iraq -- and probably in Afghanistan as well. Yet much of that good news doesn't get reported at all and what does get reported rates at most brief a "by the way" down in the bowels of articles emphasizing the growing strength of the insurgency and the death tolls it is causing.
Why is that? I think it probably has a lot to do with pure spite. We (I include myself in this group) so despise the decision to invade Iraq in that the prospect of a stable, secular democracy in Iraq fills us with almost as much (maybe more) dread than does the prospect of America sneaking ignobly out of Iraq and of Iraq descending into something like the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. It is important, we think, that really stupid decisions result in really bad outcomes so as to avoid creating incentives to make similarly stupid decisions in the future. The power of this dark side to the opposition of the war is so seductive that we find ourselves subconsciously wishing for the worst -- and find in the insurgency story more than enough "news" to allow us to conclude that "we were right!"
That's a horrible mistake. However wrong-headed the original invasion was, we have to get over that antipathy and hope that the results turn out well -- even if that ends up meaning that Bush and the neo-cons get to crow. And, in this regard, the elections -- and the reporting one them -- are nothing but good news. I hope that we can continue to focus on that side of the developments in Iraq -- and Afghanistan -- as assiduously as we focus on the problems.
Monday, January 31, 2005
Friday, January 28, 2005
Note to Bush: Let it be
One of the joys of reading is that every once in a while you come across something that causes otherwise vague thoughts or senses to coalesce into an orderly and informative pattern. Robert Wright provided me with just such a moment this morning in his NY Times op-ed piece "The Market Shall Set You Free." I hate the title. It is smacks so much of simple-minded capitalist cant that I actually expected the article to be a heavy-handed parody a la Maureen Dowd. (NB: We can't blame Wright for the title, though, since it is the NYT op-ed editors that write the headlines). As a result, I initially skipped over the piece. But fortunately, I finished reading everything else of interest before I finished breakfast, so I started to read Wright's piece while I finished my coffee.
The first paragraph did little two allay my skepticism. It presaged yet another editorial critique or paean -- I couldn't tell which -- of Bush's Inaugural Address. But then I came to this:
Wright's basic thesis is this: Bush is right that history has "a visible direction" toward freedom and away from tyranny. But Bush and the neocons are wrong to suggest that this direction needs to be buttressed by American power. In fact, Wright argues, the exercise of coercive power in pursuit of freedom is actually counter-productive.
Wright argues that the greatest enemy of tyranny is not American (or Western) military or economic power. Nor is it the craving for "freedom" and "democracy" that Bush supposes to be universal. Rather it is, quite simply, the "pre-eminence of capitalism as a wealth generator." Given this pre-eminence, a country must "either embrace free markets or fall slowly into economic oblivion." But to secure the benefits of capitalism, the tyrant must provide his citizens "with access to information technology and the freedom to use it - and that means having political power." Given this, Wright argues that best -- perhaps the only -- way to effectively pursue the spread of political freedom is to draw tyrants into the world economic system. "Involvement in the larger capitalist world is time-release poison for tyranny."
To illustrate this point, Wright invites the reader to contrast Cuba with China. "Four decades of economic isolation have transformed Fidel Castro from a young, fiery dictator into an old, fiery dictator" and have utterly failed to advance the cause of either freedom or democracy in Cuba. In contrast, the West's consistent commitment to integrating China into the world's economy has resulted in significant progress toward political freedom. "[T]o be sure, neoconservatives can rightly point to lots of oppression and brutality in China. But anyone who talks as if Chinese freedom hasn't grown since China went capitalist is evincing a hazy historical memory and, however obliquely, is abetting war. Right-wing hawks thrive on depicting tyranny as a force of nature, when in fact nature is working toward its demise."
(I had to smile at this -- and at the reference to Cuba in particular. A number of years ago a colleague posited that the best way to bring about democratic reform in Cuba was not to embargo them but to bombard them with LL Bean catalogues and pre-paid Visa cards.)
This train of thought crystallized the reasons for my considerable ambivalence about Bush's speech. I fully support the goals. It is the means I have a problem with -- not just because they are violent and naive, but because they are doomed to be self-defeating.
Bush has the cart before the horse. His goal is political freedom and he seeks to achieve that goal through coercive means -- military, economic, and diplomatic. The means he should be using is economic integration. First, progress toward economic integration it is much easier to achieve (a) because it does not pose a direct or immediate threat to the tyrant's political power and (b) because even tyrants want their countries to be "players" on the world stage. Second, as Wright argues, economic integration is by far the most effective way for the outside world to foster political change within a politically repressive country.
This is not to say that there is no place for coercive power. But, the immediate goal for the exercise of such power should not be political change but stability. Threats against one's neighbors are a no-no, and tyrants should understand that aggression simply will not be tolerated. Similarly, coercive intervention in the internal affairs of countries may also be appropriate in places like the Balkans in the 1990s and the Sudan today, where people are actually killing each other. But the goal of such efforts should not be to advance freedom and democracy as such. It should be to restore basic order.
Beyond those types of situations, we would be far better served by offering inducements than by imposing punishments. Rather than using economic and diplomatic sanctions to punish "bad" behavior, it would be more productive to use economic and diplomatic rewards to encourage "good behavior." What if, instead of standing aloof and threatening to bomb Iran -- a tactic that only confirms for them the need for a nuclear deterrent -- we said that if you agree to give up your nuclear program, we will give you "most favored nation" trading status and sponsor membership for you in the WTO. As Wright argues, such an approach is far more likely to be effective in getting Iran to renounce its nuclear ambitions. But, beyond that, it has the potential to actually be "a twofer - you draw tyrants into a web of commerce that will ultimately spell their doom, and they pay for the privilege by disarming."
Perhaps it is trite, but I am reminded in all of this of the following the Aesop fable:
The first paragraph did little two allay my skepticism. It presaged yet another editorial critique or paean -- I couldn't tell which -- of Bush's Inaugural Address. But then I came to this:
But the problem with the speech is actually [that] Mr. Bush has too little hope, and too little faith. He underestimates the impetus behind freedom and so doesn't see how powerfully it imparts a "visible direction" to history. This lack of faith helps explain some of his biggest foreign policy failures and suggests that there are more to come.Huh? The problem with Bush is that he has too little faith? Too little hope? Are you kidding me?
Wright's basic thesis is this: Bush is right that history has "a visible direction" toward freedom and away from tyranny. But Bush and the neocons are wrong to suggest that this direction needs to be buttressed by American power. In fact, Wright argues, the exercise of coercive power in pursuit of freedom is actually counter-productive.
Wright argues that the greatest enemy of tyranny is not American (or Western) military or economic power. Nor is it the craving for "freedom" and "democracy" that Bush supposes to be universal. Rather it is, quite simply, the "pre-eminence of capitalism as a wealth generator." Given this pre-eminence, a country must "either embrace free markets or fall slowly into economic oblivion." But to secure the benefits of capitalism, the tyrant must provide his citizens "with access to information technology and the freedom to use it - and that means having political power." Given this, Wright argues that best -- perhaps the only -- way to effectively pursue the spread of political freedom is to draw tyrants into the world economic system. "Involvement in the larger capitalist world is time-release poison for tyranny."
To illustrate this point, Wright invites the reader to contrast Cuba with China. "Four decades of economic isolation have transformed Fidel Castro from a young, fiery dictator into an old, fiery dictator" and have utterly failed to advance the cause of either freedom or democracy in Cuba. In contrast, the West's consistent commitment to integrating China into the world's economy has resulted in significant progress toward political freedom. "[T]o be sure, neoconservatives can rightly point to lots of oppression and brutality in China. But anyone who talks as if Chinese freedom hasn't grown since China went capitalist is evincing a hazy historical memory and, however obliquely, is abetting war. Right-wing hawks thrive on depicting tyranny as a force of nature, when in fact nature is working toward its demise."
(I had to smile at this -- and at the reference to Cuba in particular. A number of years ago a colleague posited that the best way to bring about democratic reform in Cuba was not to embargo them but to bombard them with LL Bean catalogues and pre-paid Visa cards.)
This train of thought crystallized the reasons for my considerable ambivalence about Bush's speech. I fully support the goals. It is the means I have a problem with -- not just because they are violent and naive, but because they are doomed to be self-defeating.
Bush has the cart before the horse. His goal is political freedom and he seeks to achieve that goal through coercive means -- military, economic, and diplomatic. The means he should be using is economic integration. First, progress toward economic integration it is much easier to achieve (a) because it does not pose a direct or immediate threat to the tyrant's political power and (b) because even tyrants want their countries to be "players" on the world stage. Second, as Wright argues, economic integration is by far the most effective way for the outside world to foster political change within a politically repressive country.
This is not to say that there is no place for coercive power. But, the immediate goal for the exercise of such power should not be political change but stability. Threats against one's neighbors are a no-no, and tyrants should understand that aggression simply will not be tolerated. Similarly, coercive intervention in the internal affairs of countries may also be appropriate in places like the Balkans in the 1990s and the Sudan today, where people are actually killing each other. But the goal of such efforts should not be to advance freedom and democracy as such. It should be to restore basic order.
Beyond those types of situations, we would be far better served by offering inducements than by imposing punishments. Rather than using economic and diplomatic sanctions to punish "bad" behavior, it would be more productive to use economic and diplomatic rewards to encourage "good behavior." What if, instead of standing aloof and threatening to bomb Iran -- a tactic that only confirms for them the need for a nuclear deterrent -- we said that if you agree to give up your nuclear program, we will give you "most favored nation" trading status and sponsor membership for you in the WTO. As Wright argues, such an approach is far more likely to be effective in getting Iran to renounce its nuclear ambitions. But, beyond that, it has the potential to actually be "a twofer - you draw tyrants into a web of commerce that will ultimately spell their doom, and they pay for the privilege by disarming."
Perhaps it is trite, but I am reminded in all of this of the following the Aesop fable:
Courtesy of Professor Copper Giloth and his students, U. Mass, Amherst.The Wind and the Sun were disputing which was the stronger. Suddenly they saw a traveller coming down the road, and the Sun said: "I see a way to decide our dispute. Whichever of us can cause that traveller to take off his cloak shall be regarded as the stronger. You begin."
So the Sun retired behind a cloud, and the Wind began to blow as hard as it could upon the traveller. But the harder he blew the more closely did the traveller wrap his cloak round him, till at last the Wind had to give in despair.
Then the Sun came out and shone in all his glory upon the traveller, who soon found it too hot to walk with his cloak on.
SS 3: The Chilean Experience
The NY Times had a front page article yesterday on The Chilean experience with private retirement accounts. Bush has pointed to the Chilean pension system as a good example of how privatization can work, so, for those of us who are intrigued by the privitization concept, the NYT article is disturbing: It reports that many of the Chileans who participated in the private-accounts program wished now that they had not.
The article talks about two different aspects of the problem. The first is that, contrary to predictions, the "social safety net" part of the program has continued to grow over the 20+ years since the introduction of private accounts. This is partly a transition issue. The private account system is mandatory only for people entering the workforce after 1980. Thus, at this point, all; of the people required to participate are 40 or less and have yet to retire. Many people over 40 today, especially those who were over 40 in 1981 probably opted to stay in the defined-benefits program either for the security it provided or because they did not have enough time to accumulate the amounts in private accounts necessary to provide benefits comparable to those provided by the defined benefit option. In addition, though, the biggest source of the problem with the social safety net growth is that approximately 50% of Chile's work force is outside the pension system altogether "because they earned much of their income in the underground economy, are self-employed, or work only seasonally."
Given these factors, the continuing increase in social safety net costs may not be all that surprising and almost certainly is not a reason to reject privitization as unworkable.
The other problem the article identifies is more of a concern. The article indicates that the program has not worked even for middle class people who have participated for 20+ years:
As the times indicates, part of the explanation for Mr Saez's disappointment lies in absurdly high administrative fees. By my rough estimate, administrative fees would have to run 5% or more to chew up a third of the a participant's contribution over 20 years; much more than that for shorter terms. This is at least 20 times the fees associated with a typical no-load index fund in the United States. Thus, this part of the problem is clearly avoidable.
Even so, though, a more detailed look at Mr Saez's case -- at least as described in the Times, does make one important point that bears emphasis: compound growth is "magical", but it requires time. Most of the benefit of compounding comes in the last 5 years before retirement.
Take this extrapolation of the facts provided by the Times as an example. Mr. Seaz contributed 10% of his salary to his private account for 24 years, beginning in 1981 at age 37. He had a final pre-retirement salary of $950 per month, or $11,400 per year. The Times doesn't provide any information on his earnings history, so, for the sake of example, assume his salary increased 5% per year over the 24 years between 1981 and 2004. Under this assumption, his salary would have been about $3500 in 1981. Assume also a 10% return on investment (the average reported by the Times) and an expense rate of 0.2%. Under these assumptions, Mr. Seas would have accumulated just under $50,000 in his account by 2004. At an annuity rate of 8% (2% less than the actual average rate of return for the previous 24 years), this would have provided Mr. Seas with a monthly annuity of $416, or 44% of his 2004 salary, still well short of the $700/month that the Times implies he would have been entitled to had he stayed in the defined benefit program.
Admittedly, this disparity seems odd. But it is explained, in part at least, by the fact that Mr. Seas had "only" 24 years in the program, starting at 37 and retiring at 61. If he had been 15 years younger, so that he had 39 years in the program when he reached 61(and holding all other assumptions constant), his account would have totaled $260,000, which would provide a monthly annuity of $2,174, 110% of his new final retirement salary of $1,975/month, and nearly double the maximum benefit payable under the defined benefit system. In short, Mr. Saez's problem -- apart from fees -- is that he was not in the program long enough.
This story illustrate some important points about privatization. First, and most obvioulsy, fees have to be kept low. Given the limited range of investments being contemplated by most privatization proposals, the huge amounts of money involved and the very, very limited overhead that will be involved in managing these accounts, limiting fees to less than 0.2% should be an easily attainable goal.
Second, you can't take a person in the middle of his working life out of the defined benefit plan entirely and expect him to do as well with private accounts as he would do under the defined benefit system. There has to be a phase-out. Suppose for instance, that a typical working life were considered to be 38 years (age 22 to 60). Mr. Seaz had worked 15 of those years before starting with the private accounts. If his annutiy from the private account had been supplemented with 15/38ths (39%) of the $700/month benefit he would have been entitled to had he stayed in the defined benefit system, his total retirement income would have be $691/month -- $416 from his own annuity and $276 per month in defined benefits -- almost exactly equal to the benefit for a comaprable person in the program.
Third, while Bush is wrong to claim that there is a crisis in Social Security, he is absolutely right to argue that, if we are going to move to a system of private accounts, now is the time to begin. Private accounts do have the promise of providing enormous benefits to retirees -- but only if they are investing in such accounts for 30 years or more. Thus, at any given point in time, the only people who can be taken entirely out of the system are those who are under 30. If we wait another 10 to 15 years to begin taking the under-30s out of the system, the number of people over 30 -- who must remain in the system to some degree -- will be far larger than it is today, making the transition costs all that much higher.
Finally, it will take at least 30 years or more to phase out the current system entirely. During that entire period, social security benefits will place an ever increasing burden on general revenues as an ever growing number of people are outside the defined benefit system and no longer paying social security taxes. These costs will be enormous and will fall primarily on our children -- unless, as part of the transition, we oldsters agree to take up a part of that burden by accepting a reduction in the benfits we expect our children to pay us.
Conceptually, there are three groups of people implicated by this issue: Those 45 and older (us), those 20 to 45 (our childen), and those 0 to 20 (our grandchildren). Privatization offers enormous benefits for our grandchildren, but securing those benefits is going to require sacrifice by the other two groups: higher taxes/national debt for our children and higher taxes and reduced benefits for ourselves. To my mind, though, the sacrifices are worth it.
(Note: I am not talking about the poor here. I consider the poor to be a separate issue. As a part of any reform, I would support a provision guarnteeing to all retirees benefits equal to the greater of (1) the benefits to which they are entitled given their contributions or (2) 125-150% of the poverty level for persons their age).
The article talks about two different aspects of the problem. The first is that, contrary to predictions, the "social safety net" part of the program has continued to grow over the 20+ years since the introduction of private accounts. This is partly a transition issue. The private account system is mandatory only for people entering the workforce after 1980. Thus, at this point, all; of the people required to participate are 40 or less and have yet to retire. Many people over 40 today, especially those who were over 40 in 1981 probably opted to stay in the defined-benefits program either for the security it provided or because they did not have enough time to accumulate the amounts in private accounts necessary to provide benefits comparable to those provided by the defined benefit option. In addition, though, the biggest source of the problem with the social safety net growth is that approximately 50% of Chile's work force is outside the pension system altogether "because they earned much of their income in the underground economy, are self-employed, or work only seasonally."
Given these factors, the continuing increase in social safety net costs may not be all that surprising and almost certainly is not a reason to reject privitization as unworkable.
The other problem the article identifies is more of a concern. The article indicates that the program has not worked even for middle class people who have participated for 20+ years:
Even many middle-class workers who contributed regularly are finding that their private accounts - burdened with hidden fees that may have soaked up as much as a third of their original investment - are failing to deliver as much in benefits as they would have received if they had stayed in the old system.According to the Times, "The[se] problems have emerged despite what all here agree is the main strength of the privatized system: an average 10 percent annual return on investments." (Emphasis added)
Dagoberto Sáez, for example, is a 66-year-old laboratory technician here who plans, because of a recent heart attack, to retire in March. He earns just under $950 a month; his pension fund has told him that his nearly 24 years of contributions will finance a 20-year annuity paying only $315 a month.
"Colleagues and friends with the same pay grade who stayed in the old system, people who work right alongside me," he said, "are retiring with pensions of almost $700 a month - good until they die. I have a salary that allows me to live with dignity, and all of a sudden I am going to be plunged into poverty, all because I made the mistake of believing the promises they made to us back in 1981."
As the times indicates, part of the explanation for Mr Saez's disappointment lies in absurdly high administrative fees. By my rough estimate, administrative fees would have to run 5% or more to chew up a third of the a participant's contribution over 20 years; much more than that for shorter terms. This is at least 20 times the fees associated with a typical no-load index fund in the United States. Thus, this part of the problem is clearly avoidable.
Even so, though, a more detailed look at Mr Saez's case -- at least as described in the Times, does make one important point that bears emphasis: compound growth is "magical", but it requires time. Most of the benefit of compounding comes in the last 5 years before retirement.
Take this extrapolation of the facts provided by the Times as an example. Mr. Seaz contributed 10% of his salary to his private account for 24 years, beginning in 1981 at age 37. He had a final pre-retirement salary of $950 per month, or $11,400 per year. The Times doesn't provide any information on his earnings history, so, for the sake of example, assume his salary increased 5% per year over the 24 years between 1981 and 2004. Under this assumption, his salary would have been about $3500 in 1981. Assume also a 10% return on investment (the average reported by the Times) and an expense rate of 0.2%. Under these assumptions, Mr. Seas would have accumulated just under $50,000 in his account by 2004. At an annuity rate of 8% (2% less than the actual average rate of return for the previous 24 years), this would have provided Mr. Seas with a monthly annuity of $416, or 44% of his 2004 salary, still well short of the $700/month that the Times implies he would have been entitled to had he stayed in the defined benefit program.
Admittedly, this disparity seems odd. But it is explained, in part at least, by the fact that Mr. Seas had "only" 24 years in the program, starting at 37 and retiring at 61. If he had been 15 years younger, so that he had 39 years in the program when he reached 61(and holding all other assumptions constant), his account would have totaled $260,000, which would provide a monthly annuity of $2,174, 110% of his new final retirement salary of $1,975/month, and nearly double the maximum benefit payable under the defined benefit system. In short, Mr. Saez's problem -- apart from fees -- is that he was not in the program long enough.
This story illustrate some important points about privatization. First, and most obvioulsy, fees have to be kept low. Given the limited range of investments being contemplated by most privatization proposals, the huge amounts of money involved and the very, very limited overhead that will be involved in managing these accounts, limiting fees to less than 0.2% should be an easily attainable goal.
Second, you can't take a person in the middle of his working life out of the defined benefit plan entirely and expect him to do as well with private accounts as he would do under the defined benefit system. There has to be a phase-out. Suppose for instance, that a typical working life were considered to be 38 years (age 22 to 60). Mr. Seaz had worked 15 of those years before starting with the private accounts. If his annutiy from the private account had been supplemented with 15/38ths (39%) of the $700/month benefit he would have been entitled to had he stayed in the defined benefit system, his total retirement income would have be $691/month -- $416 from his own annuity and $276 per month in defined benefits -- almost exactly equal to the benefit for a comaprable person in the program.
Third, while Bush is wrong to claim that there is a crisis in Social Security, he is absolutely right to argue that, if we are going to move to a system of private accounts, now is the time to begin. Private accounts do have the promise of providing enormous benefits to retirees -- but only if they are investing in such accounts for 30 years or more. Thus, at any given point in time, the only people who can be taken entirely out of the system are those who are under 30. If we wait another 10 to 15 years to begin taking the under-30s out of the system, the number of people over 30 -- who must remain in the system to some degree -- will be far larger than it is today, making the transition costs all that much higher.
Finally, it will take at least 30 years or more to phase out the current system entirely. During that entire period, social security benefits will place an ever increasing burden on general revenues as an ever growing number of people are outside the defined benefit system and no longer paying social security taxes. These costs will be enormous and will fall primarily on our children -- unless, as part of the transition, we oldsters agree to take up a part of that burden by accepting a reduction in the benfits we expect our children to pay us.
Conceptually, there are three groups of people implicated by this issue: Those 45 and older (us), those 20 to 45 (our childen), and those 0 to 20 (our grandchildren). Privatization offers enormous benefits for our grandchildren, but securing those benefits is going to require sacrifice by the other two groups: higher taxes/national debt for our children and higher taxes and reduced benefits for ourselves. To my mind, though, the sacrifices are worth it.
(Note: I am not talking about the poor here. I consider the poor to be a separate issue. As a part of any reform, I would support a provision guarnteeing to all retirees benefits equal to the greater of (1) the benefits to which they are entitled given their contributions or (2) 125-150% of the poverty level for persons their age).
Thursday, January 27, 2005
SS 2
Last night, I sent the e-mail below to Kevin Drum, Matt Yglesias, Atrios, and Max. I got a response from Kevin. It was more than I expected -- but less than I had hoped. Here are my original question, Kevin's reponse and my follow-up question, which he has not answered (yet?):
From Bill:
From Bill:
I really am trying to figure this SS thing out, but I am getting tired of all the abstract discussion. Does anyone want to take a shot at telling me why I should hate the NPCA reform proposal? (This was being shilled by Pete Du Pont in an op-ed piece on the WSJ "Opinion Journal" today). I pick that one only because it is the first concrete proposal -- with numbers and everything -- I have come across. Any other one would do so long as it is specific and published.From Kevin:
NCPA tends to be more honest than most groups. A quick glance at this one indicates that they're proposing additional funds (workers and employers both have to contribute an extra 1.25% above and beyond what they contribute now). At least, that's what it looks like. If that's the case, it probably works fine, although I haven't looked at the math in detail.From Bill:
Of course, if we raised taxes by a total of 2.5% right now, Social Security would be fine with no changes. If you assume additional revenue, lots of plans look good.
Thanks. Now, here's my real question. The plan is for a phase-out of the pay as you go system. If all that takes is moving the payroll tax up another 2.5% -- which I suspect will happen anyway eventually -- why not do it?Not much, admittedly, but to my mind, encouraging nonethless. Maybe it is not privatization per se that the Left (to the extent Keven may be considered representative of the Left) is against. Maybe it is just the way Bush proposes to get there. I'd love it if we could talk about that instead of the red herring (for both sides) of whether there is a "crisis" is SS.
My sense is that "privatization" is a good idea and all we really ought be debating is how to get there. Bush wants to do it with more borrowing (I guess). I think that's a terrible idea -- especially given where we are today. But where I want to fight is on means, not ends.
Wednesday, January 26, 2005
Now Here's Some Good News
Courtesy of Laura Rozen, Douglas Feith, one of the principal architects of the Iraq invasion, is quitting. One down two (Wolfy and Rummy) to go.
A Concrete SS Reform Proposal
Pete Dupont, former Governor of Delware, and chairman on the National Center for Policy Analysis is pitching the NCPA's plan for reforming social security in today's issue of the WSJ Opinion Journal. The NCPA Plan itself is here. The editorial is nothing new, but I found the Plan interesting reading, in part becuase it is the first concrete proposal on this -- with numbers and everything -- that I have seen.
On its face at least, it seems to make some sense as a way to get from a pay-as-you-go plan to a retirement savings system. But, I have two concerns, one specific and one general. The specific concern is this statement:
The second and more general concern is that I don't know enough to evaluate the numbers they throw around. In an effort to address this problem I posted a request for help as a comment to Kevin Drum's latest post on SS. But, I suspect that will get lost in the noise there, so I may try e-mailing Kevin and a few others to see if I can get a reactions. If I do, I will link them here.
In the meantime, though, if there is anyone reading this that has any thoughts on the plan let me know.
On its face at least, it seems to make some sense as a way to get from a pay-as-you-go plan to a retirement savings system. But, I have two concerns, one specific and one general. The specific concern is this statement:
It is reasonable to expect firms managing personal retirement account assets to receive compensation for their services; after all, there will be some 148 million accounts to manage. By limiting options and structuring the accounts carefully, administrative fees could be reduced.Let's see, NCPA is projecting that private accounts will ultimately "average" $330,000 per person and that there will be 148 million such accounts, so the total projected investment in these accounts would be close to $50 trillion dollars. At a cost rate of 0.2 percent (the midpoint of the proposals cited by NPCA, the administartive costs would then be $100 billion . . . per year?! Holy cow! Can they really be serious?
The 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security assumed administrative costs of 0.105 percentage points for the Individual Accounts option.
The President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security assumed administrative costs of 0.3 percent. (Footnotes omitted).
The second and more general concern is that I don't know enough to evaluate the numbers they throw around. In an effort to address this problem I posted a request for help as a comment to Kevin Drum's latest post on SS. But, I suspect that will get lost in the noise there, so I may try e-mailing Kevin and a few others to see if I can get a reactions. If I do, I will link them here.
In the meantime, though, if there is anyone reading this that has any thoughts on the plan let me know.
Oil fever
Republicans, their oil grabs stymied in ANWR and exposed in Iraq, fall uponPennsylvaniain an effort to save social secuirty.
Tuesday, January 25, 2005
More on the Guantanamo Detainees
On Friday, Judge Richard Leon of the United Stated District Court in DC issued an order holding that non-citizens have no legal basis for challenging their detention at Gitmo in federal court. For those of you who, like me, thought that the Supreme Court effectively held just the opposite in Rasul and Hamdi last year, think again ... perhaps.
I spent more time than I care to admit this evening writing a "considered legal analysis" of the decision, but blogspot promptly lost it entirely when I tried to post it. (Note to Google: Get this site fixed or it's going to be worthless!) So, you get the shortened version.
For a summary of the Supreme Court rulings on the detainee issues, see part three of this post. In Friday's decision (on remand from the Supreme Court) the district court held that, although the federal courts had jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by aliens held at Guantanamo, those aliens had no substantive basis under the Constitution, federal law, or international law, to challenge their detentions. This holding is awfully hard to square with either the language or the rationales of the Supreme Court decisions discussed in the earlier post referenced above, and my sense is that, when the Supreme Court ultimately gets the case again, it will reverse and find that a non-citizen, like a citizen, is entitled to "notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker." See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.
But to me, the more important question is why the Bush administration is still bucking this outcome. Remember, the Supreme Court has already agreed that, at lest where (as here) Congress has acted to specifically authorize military action, the right of the President to detain "enemy combatants" for the duration of the conflict (whatever that means) is inherent in the President's War Powers. So, the right to detain enemy combatants, essentially indefinitely, is no longer in dispute. The only remaining issue is whether alien detainees have thee right to challenge the government assertion that they are, in fact, "enemy combatants". Given that the Supreme Court has pretty narrowly construed the "process that is due", even to citizens in such a case, it really is hard to figure why the government would fight such a right. Unless, of course, the government really does contend that it has no constitutional (or moral) obligations toward anyone it (unilaterally) determines is a threat to national security.
I spent more time than I care to admit this evening writing a "considered legal analysis" of the decision, but blogspot promptly lost it entirely when I tried to post it. (Note to Google: Get this site fixed or it's going to be worthless!) So, you get the shortened version.
For a summary of the Supreme Court rulings on the detainee issues, see part three of this post. In Friday's decision (on remand from the Supreme Court) the district court held that, although the federal courts had jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by aliens held at Guantanamo, those aliens had no substantive basis under the Constitution, federal law, or international law, to challenge their detentions. This holding is awfully hard to square with either the language or the rationales of the Supreme Court decisions discussed in the earlier post referenced above, and my sense is that, when the Supreme Court ultimately gets the case again, it will reverse and find that a non-citizen, like a citizen, is entitled to "notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker." See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.
But to me, the more important question is why the Bush administration is still bucking this outcome. Remember, the Supreme Court has already agreed that, at lest where (as here) Congress has acted to specifically authorize military action, the right of the President to detain "enemy combatants" for the duration of the conflict (whatever that means) is inherent in the President's War Powers. So, the right to detain enemy combatants, essentially indefinitely, is no longer in dispute. The only remaining issue is whether alien detainees have thee right to challenge the government assertion that they are, in fact, "enemy combatants". Given that the Supreme Court has pretty narrowly construed the "process that is due", even to citizens in such a case, it really is hard to figure why the government would fight such a right. Unless, of course, the government really does contend that it has no constitutional (or moral) obligations toward anyone it (unilaterally) determines is a threat to national security.
Torture Redux
Courtesy of Laura Rozen, the juxtaposition of this article ("Torture in Iraq Still Routine, Report Says") and this article ("Army Closed Many Abuse Cases Early") in today's Washington Post is just so sad. I don't know if this is true, but on the surface at least, our handling of these events contrasts poorly with the British response to similar yet much less pervasive activities by its soldiers.
In Defense of Condi
The Wall Street Journal offers a sycophantic paean to Condi Rice, bemoaning, along the way, the "legion of ankle biters" who question where she and her boss have taken the country. Without any apparent irony, the Journal lauds Dr. Rice as being "instrumental in developing the administration's response to 9/11 into a policy that involved more than raiding terrorist camps throughout the world. Ms. Rice, who well understands the larger global political forces at work since the end of the Cold War, was one of a handful of powerbrokers who came to realize the best defense against terrorism was to spread freedom and democracy in the world."
Oh, my. For anyone who is paying attention, that actually sounds more like an indictment than a basis for praise. Lest we forget, here's what actually happened:
1."We have to go into Iraq because: Saddam Hussein + WMDs + support of Al Queda = an imminent threat to the security of the United States."
2."Woops. No WMDs and no ties to Al Queda. Well, lets pretend that the REAL reason we invaded the country was to spread freedom and democracy."
3."OK. That sells. We got re-elected didn't we? So, now lets make the spread of freedom and democracy our national policy."
Is the WSJ really suggesting that we should all be "just thrilled" to have a Secretary of State who appears committed (either personally or as a "good soldier") to pursuing our Iraqi policies throughout the world?
I don't know who to be angrier at, the Administration or its apologists. The Administration hit one ice berg due to lack of care and judgment. Unable to admit that, it now claims that it intended to hit the iceberg and that this was really just first step in a national policy of driving the ship of state into every iceberg we can find so as to eliminate the menace of floating ice. They don't actually believe this of course. For them, the rhetoric is pure expediency. But what, pray tell, is the WSJ's excuse?
Oh, my. For anyone who is paying attention, that actually sounds more like an indictment than a basis for praise. Lest we forget, here's what actually happened:
1."We have to go into Iraq because: Saddam Hussein + WMDs + support of Al Queda = an imminent threat to the security of the United States."
2."Woops. No WMDs and no ties to Al Queda. Well, lets pretend that the REAL reason we invaded the country was to spread freedom and democracy."
3."OK. That sells. We got re-elected didn't we? So, now lets make the spread of freedom and democracy our national policy."
Is the WSJ really suggesting that we should all be "just thrilled" to have a Secretary of State who appears committed (either personally or as a "good soldier") to pursuing our Iraqi policies throughout the world?
I don't know who to be angrier at, the Administration or its apologists. The Administration hit one ice berg due to lack of care and judgment. Unable to admit that, it now claims that it intended to hit the iceberg and that this was really just first step in a national policy of driving the ship of state into every iceberg we can find so as to eliminate the menace of floating ice. They don't actually believe this of course. For them, the rhetoric is pure expediency. But what, pray tell, is the WSJ's excuse?
Now we can laugh
Dana Milbanks offers an ascerbic eulogy to John Ashcroft. Yet do we not detect a note of nostalgia?
Explorations on the Far Side
My apologies to Gary Larson, but it just seemed so apt with respect to what follows.
As I indicated in my last post yesterday, I spent some time last night prowling around in the world of conservative journalism and blogs. I haven't done enough of that yet to get a sense of things, so I will withhold judgment for a while. But I couldn't resist this one.
The Wall Street Journal's list of their favorite web sites led me to Instapundit, where there was a brief post indicating that Bush's Inaugural Address had played well in Iran. Intrigued, I followed the link to this post by Pejman Yousefzadeh. Since this post consisted almost entirely of a quotation from yet another source, followed that link as well, and ended up at a at post by the "Student Movement Coordination Committee for Democracy in Iran."
This article does report that Bush's speech was greeted with wild approval. The problem, though, is that the article is entirely devoid of support. It is based exclusively on "reports" that are wholly unattributed and asserts as facts events for which no scintilla of evidence is provided.
For example, the lead paragraph is this:
That's not really the problem, though. The problem is that this "report" has been picked up a uncritically re-disseminated by several blogs, one of which is a "favorite" of the Wall Street Journal.
Last week, Seymour Hersh reported that "'The civilians in the Pentagon want to go into Iran and destroy as much of the military infrastructure as possible,'" and that "'The Pentagon's contingency plans for a broader invasion of Iran are also being updated,'" based partly on a belief that there is widespread internal opposition within Iran that would coalesce and overthrow the existing government if only the United States would act decisively:
I had a brief sojourn with AA a couple of years back. The not-drinking part didn't stick, but one aphorism did: "Insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results."
As I indicated in my last post yesterday, I spent some time last night prowling around in the world of conservative journalism and blogs. I haven't done enough of that yet to get a sense of things, so I will withhold judgment for a while. But I couldn't resist this one.
The Wall Street Journal's list of their favorite web sites led me to Instapundit, where there was a brief post indicating that Bush's Inaugural Address had played well in Iran. Intrigued, I followed the link to this post by Pejman Yousefzadeh. Since this post consisted almost entirely of a quotation from yet another source, followed that link as well, and ended up at a at post by the "Student Movement Coordination Committee for Democracy in Iran."
This article does report that Bush's speech was greeted with wild approval. The problem, though, is that the article is entirely devoid of support. It is based exclusively on "reports" that are wholly unattributed and asserts as facts events for which no scintilla of evidence is provided.
For example, the lead paragraph is this:
Reports from across Iran are stating about the massive welcoming of President George W. Bush's inaugural speech and his promise of helping to bring down the last outposts of tyranny.One would think that if there were reports "from across Iran", it would be possible to cite at least one, or explain at least how the authors came to know of these reports. But they do not. The second paragraph continues in this vein:
Millions of Iranians have been reported as having stayed home, on Thursday night which is their usual W.end and outgoing night, in order to see or hear the Presidential speech.The rest of the "article" is more of the same: utterly without support or attribution, shot through with the passive voice and making claims that only the determinedly credulous could take at face value. The article has all the hallmarks of a fabrication.
That's not really the problem, though. The problem is that this "report" has been picked up a uncritically re-disseminated by several blogs, one of which is a "favorite" of the Wall Street Journal.
Last week, Seymour Hersh reported that "'The civilians in the Pentagon want to go into Iran and destroy as much of the military infrastructure as possible,'" and that "'The Pentagon's contingency plans for a broader invasion of Iran are also being updated,'" based partly on a belief that there is widespread internal opposition within Iran that would coalesce and overthrow the existing government if only the United States would act decisively:
The government consultant told me that the hawks in the Pentagon, in private discussions, have been urging a limited attack on Iran because they believe it could lead to a toppling of the religious leadership. "Within the soul of Iran there is a struggle between secular nationalists and reformers, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the fundamentalist Islamic movement," the consultant told me. "The minute the aura of invincibility which the mullahs enjoy is shattered, and with it the ability to hoodwink the West, the Iranian regime will collapse"like the former Communist regimes in Romania, East Germany, and the Soviet Union. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz share that belief, he said.Where does this belief come from? Is it possible that they actually accept as true the assertions such as those quoted above?
I had a brief sojourn with AA a couple of years back. The not-drinking part didn't stick, but one aphorism did: "Insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results."
Monday, January 24, 2005
What Is Liberalism?
The American Prospect Online has asked readers to provide what they call "an elevator pitch" for liberalism: i.e short, succinct statement (30 words or less) that captures what "liberals" stand for. It is a question that bears considerable thought these days.
Here's their update on the progress so far, with some links to the responses that have already been vetted and posted. They are worth browsing through. My favorite so far is:
Here's their update on the progress so far, with some links to the responses that have already been vetted and posted. They are worth browsing through. My favorite so far is:
"I am my brother's/sister's keeper but not his/her judge. --C.M. "I especially like the symmetry of the converse as a statement of the non-liberal view:
"I am my brother's judge but not his keeper"I just wish we could get away from the "brother/sister" "his/her" nonsense. But isn't that part of the problem with making the succinct case for liberalism: too much angst over too many issues?
The Pink Libertarian
I have been trolling for a couple of good conservative/libertarian blogs to follow (just to keep me honest) when I ran across The Libertarian Girl. She's young -- so young that Atlas Shrugged and The Fountainhed are still her favorite books -- and she has that combination of breezy sophistry coupled with freedom from doubt that is so irritating about people who haven't lived long enough to know much of anything. But, for all that, it's not a bad read.
Still, I think I'll keep looking for my counterpoint to Drum, Yglesias, Atrios et al. If anyone has any suggestions, let me know.
Still, I think I'll keep looking for my counterpoint to Drum, Yglesias, Atrios et al. If anyone has any suggestions, let me know.
In the Ownership Society: Clarifying What It Is We Will Own
NPR had an interesting interview this morning with David Wessel, deputy Washington bureau chief of The Wall Street Journal, on what Bush is talking about when he talks of an "ownership" society. Wessel was a lot more candid, I think, than Bush is. I don't have an actual transcript, but the following comes pretty close:
I want to think (and probably write) more about the issue before answering. For now, though, let me acknowledge considerable ambivalence.
There was a time, barely two years ago, when I subscribed to this view whole-heartedly. Freedom, I told myself, implies the freedom to fail as well as the freedom to succeed, and relying on the government to protect you from failure inevitably gives the government control over your life -- the very antithesis of what I think of as freedom. But recently, I have become less sure of this. Partly, my conversion was motivated by my antipathy for other aspects of Bush's domestic and foreign policies (see this earlier post for more on that). Having so thoroughly parted ways with Bush on these issues, it has become very difficult to agree with him on anything. But partly, I am no longer certain where I think the balance should be struck between individual freedom/responsibility on the one hand and compassion for the less fortunate (and even the less responsible)on the other.
Though that issue is much broader than Social Security, my uncertainty on this has been crystallized by the need to decide what I think about Bush's privitization proposals. My still-strong Libertarian streak is all in favor of this. In fact, one part of me thinks Bush proposals are too modest: we should move entirely away from a "Rob-Peter-to-Pay-Paul" defined benefits plan to a program where each person is allowed/required to save for his/her own retirement and is allowed/required to assume the responsibility (and risk) associated with that. On the other hand, the emerging liberal in me (as well as a lot of reading and discussions on the issue) force me to acknowledge that most people won't actually do this, and that many of those who do will do so badly. If that prediction is correct, the reality is that privitization will leave many people destitute -- and that it will do so in direct proportion to the extent of the privitization. Saying that "this is their own fault" may be true, but it is beside the point. I just do not think that society can or would abandon such people to destitution, even where their situation is due to their own irresponsibility, much less where it is due to factors beyond their control. Thus, if people fail -- as many of them would (for whatever reason) -- to save and invest wisely, society will inevitably be forced to step back in to support them. So, maybe it would be better to avoid the experiment in the first place. On the third hand, this view of the American people is so profoundly patronizing that I find it very, very hard to swallow. I am, in short, utterly schizoid on this whole "ownership" issue.
Those (few) of you who are actually reading these pages but have resisted (or have not had) the urge to comment, please change your ways. I would really be interested in hearing what you think about this issue.
Wessel: What [Bush] is talking about here goes far beyond [Social Security privitization] to changing the direction of American social policy away from a kind of government-will-take-care-of-you approach that was popular during FDR's New Deal and LBJ's Great Society into one where people take more responsibility on their own.After some discussion of similar ownership approaches to medical care (e.g. medical savings accounts) , the interviewer, Rene Montagne, asked:
Montagne: Which is still a version of "owning the responsibility?"I think Montagne's question -- actually more of a statement -- gets to the real essence of the issue: In the end, what Bush is proposing is ownership of responsibility. How do I feel about that?Wessel: Right. There is upside and downside risk here. If you make all of the decisions yourself . . . and things go well, you do well. The President likes to talk about that. He doesn't talk quite so much about the downside risk. If things go sour, you have the responsibility as well.
Montagne: Where does the notion "ownership society comes from?
Wessel: I think it comes from a very deeply held conservatism that the President has, of faith in markets and the ability of individuals to navigate them, distrust of big government, and a sense that if government did less for us, we would do more for ourselves. We'd have more incentive to take risks and prosper, and we'd be in a better society.
I want to think (and probably write) more about the issue before answering. For now, though, let me acknowledge considerable ambivalence.
There was a time, barely two years ago, when I subscribed to this view whole-heartedly. Freedom, I told myself, implies the freedom to fail as well as the freedom to succeed, and relying on the government to protect you from failure inevitably gives the government control over your life -- the very antithesis of what I think of as freedom. But recently, I have become less sure of this. Partly, my conversion was motivated by my antipathy for other aspects of Bush's domestic and foreign policies (see this earlier post for more on that). Having so thoroughly parted ways with Bush on these issues, it has become very difficult to agree with him on anything. But partly, I am no longer certain where I think the balance should be struck between individual freedom/responsibility on the one hand and compassion for the less fortunate (and even the less responsible)on the other.
Though that issue is much broader than Social Security, my uncertainty on this has been crystallized by the need to decide what I think about Bush's privitization proposals. My still-strong Libertarian streak is all in favor of this. In fact, one part of me thinks Bush proposals are too modest: we should move entirely away from a "Rob-Peter-to-Pay-Paul" defined benefits plan to a program where each person is allowed/required to save for his/her own retirement and is allowed/required to assume the responsibility (and risk) associated with that. On the other hand, the emerging liberal in me (as well as a lot of reading and discussions on the issue) force me to acknowledge that most people won't actually do this, and that many of those who do will do so badly. If that prediction is correct, the reality is that privitization will leave many people destitute -- and that it will do so in direct proportion to the extent of the privitization. Saying that "this is their own fault" may be true, but it is beside the point. I just do not think that society can or would abandon such people to destitution, even where their situation is due to their own irresponsibility, much less where it is due to factors beyond their control. Thus, if people fail -- as many of them would (for whatever reason) -- to save and invest wisely, society will inevitably be forced to step back in to support them. So, maybe it would be better to avoid the experiment in the first place. On the third hand, this view of the American people is so profoundly patronizing that I find it very, very hard to swallow. I am, in short, utterly schizoid on this whole "ownership" issue.
Those (few) of you who are actually reading these pages but have resisted (or have not had) the urge to comment, please change your ways. I would really be interested in hearing what you think about this issue.
Odds and Ends
A secular government in Iraq? . . . An article in the New York Times today reports that the Iraqi Shiites, who seem destined to win a large majority in the upcoming elections, "have decided to put a secular face on the new Iraqi government they plan to form, relegating Islam to a supporting role." Oh, if only that is so. And, that if only it would stay that way. It's hard to believe that this is how things will turn out in fact though.
Safire Out To Pasture . . . William Safire announced his retirement as a New York Times Op-Ed columnist with a quartet of columns on his "relationships" (his word, not mine) with First Ladies from Pat Nixon to Hillary Clinton, a lookback at the status of some of his "journalistic crusades," some amusingly self-deprecating advise on "How to Read a Column," and an elegy to self-renewal entitled "Never Retire." They are vintage Safire: urbane, witty, a touch nostalgic -- and slightly out of touch. The "Never Retire" piece, in particular, seems divorced from the reality of the people to whom it is ostensibly addressed. After attributing to himself (probably correctly -- who knows) the aphorism "When you're through changing, you're through," he goes on to offer his readers the following advice:
Still, I have to admit that Safire is right about one thing: like financial retirement planning, the trick to planning the second or third career is to start early with an avocation that we ultimately turn into a vocation. Like starting early on financial planning, though, this is advice that, for most people, is far easier to agree with than to follow.
I for one will miss Mr. Safire's opinions. If nothing else they were consistently reliable blog-fodder. I wonder who they have/will get to replace him.
More on Summers . . . . Kevin Drum asked what seems to me to be the right question about the whole imbroglio over Larry Summers remarks about the possible capability differences between men and women in math and science: Instead of wasting so much angst and ink on the genetic question, why don't we focus instead on the socialization issue. One tid-bit he cites in making this point comes from a NY Times article today summarizing some of the research on the differences in innate capabilities:
Safire Out To Pasture . . . William Safire announced his retirement as a New York Times Op-Ed columnist with a quartet of columns on his "relationships" (his word, not mine) with First Ladies from Pat Nixon to Hillary Clinton, a lookback at the status of some of his "journalistic crusades," some amusingly self-deprecating advise on "How to Read a Column," and an elegy to self-renewal entitled "Never Retire." They are vintage Safire: urbane, witty, a touch nostalgic -- and slightly out of touch. The "Never Retire" piece, in particular, seems divorced from the reality of the people to whom it is ostensibly addressed. After attributing to himself (probably correctly -- who knows) the aphorism "When you're through changing, you're through," he goes on to offer his readers the following advice:
[N]ever retire, but plan to change your career to keep your synapses snapping . . . . [R]etraining and fresh stimulation are what all of us should require in "the last of life, for which the first was made." Athletes and dancers deal with the need to retrain in their 30's, workers in their 40's, managers in their 50's, politicians in their 60's, academics and media biggies in their 70's. The trick is to start early in our careers the stress-relieving avocation that we will need later as a mind-exercising final vocation. We can quit a job, but we quit fresh involvement at our mental peril.Sound advice no doubt, but who besides someone on Safire's position can afford to do it? I suspect that most people who have worked at essentially the same job for 20 or more years daydream about finding something else to do, something to "keep the synapses snapping," as it were. But most of us are constrained to a far greater degree that Safire is by a combination of economic necessity and lack of opportunity into staying the course until it becomes just too boring and/or we are forcibly put out to pasture in favor of younger (and hungrier) blood.
Still, I have to admit that Safire is right about one thing: like financial retirement planning, the trick to planning the second or third career is to start early with an avocation that we ultimately turn into a vocation. Like starting early on financial planning, though, this is advice that, for most people, is far easier to agree with than to follow.
I for one will miss Mr. Safire's opinions. If nothing else they were consistently reliable blog-fodder. I wonder who they have/will get to replace him.
More on Summers . . . . Kevin Drum asked what seems to me to be the right question about the whole imbroglio over Larry Summers remarks about the possible capability differences between men and women in math and science: Instead of wasting so much angst and ink on the genetic question, why don't we focus instead on the socialization issue. One tid-bit he cites in making this point comes from a NY Times article today summarizing some of the research on the differences in innate capabilities:
Dr. [Megan] Urry cited a 1983 study in which 360 people — half men, half women — rated mathematics papers on a five-point scale. On average, the men rated them a full point higher when the author was "John T. McKay" than when the author was "Joan T. McKay." There was a similar, but smaller disparity in the scores the women gave. (Emphasis added).Kevin (rightly, I think) questions why this type of issue isn't getting more press. Who knows if there is a genetic difference? More important, who cares? Either way, there is little we can do about it. However, the socialization issues captured in the quoted blurb -- men's negative perceptions of women's capabilities and, perhaps more disturbing, women's negative perceptions of women's capabilities -- ARE things we could do something about. The problem with the genetic explanations for differences in capabilities is not so much that they are right or wrong. Rather it is that they provide an excuse for doing nothing Yet it seems likely that the "nurture" aspect of this problem is at least as important as the nature aspect and that is something that we have to power to impact directly. As such, that is the issue that seems worth the attention.
Friday, January 21, 2005
The Inaugural Address
I feel compelled to write something on Bush's Inaugural address, yet I confess to being uncertain what I really think about it. Listening to it, I kept thinking: "I understand all of the words, but what is it he is actually saying?" So, rather than trying to react to the speech itself, I thought I would wait until this morning so I could read the transcript and see if it made any more sense then.
Reading didn't help. In fact, if anything, the transcript seems more disjointed and far less eloquent than the speech itself did. And I have come away from the reading as confused as ever. Even -- or perhaps especially -- in print, it is just all so damn vague.
In part, of course, the speech is a craven effort to portray vice as virtue. Nowhere does he mention Iraq. Yet there is little doubt that Iraq is what he is talking about when he says this:
But there's more to the speech than self-justification. In addition to "explaining" our noble purposes in Iraq, George is also articulating (if that is the word) a vision, a theme, that will undergird his entire second term both domestically and internationally. If it were anyone but George Bush, I wouldn't take this effort too seriously. But one thing we have learned about George is that he believes this kind of rhetoric and that he does what he's says he'll do. So, anyone interested in where the country will be going in the next four years is well advised to at least try to figure out what it is he is saying.
That's hard, though. The theme, obviously, is the "expansion of freedom". I didn't count them, but William Safire, who not surprisingly loved the speech ("I rate it among the top 5 of the 20 second-inaugurals in our history"), says Bush used the words "freedom", "free" and "liberty" 49 times. While I do not question the accuracy of that count, I must say that it feels low. These words appear so frequently that the speech begins to sound like a chant: Freedom! Freedom! Freedom! Freedom!
But what exactly does George mean by freedom? And what steps does he intend to take in pursuit of the goal of expanding it both abroad and at home?
On the international side, I think the speech is really content-free. Perhaps intentionally, it allows the reader to see in it whatever the reader chooses to see and discloses nothing about what the speaker's true intentions are. If there is "meat" here it appears to be this:
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the speech is that George thinks we need to "expand freedom" domestically as well. Silly me, I thought maybe he was going to advocate repeal of the USA Patriot Act. But no, it's not freedom from government oversight and prying that George wants to expand; it's freedom from reliance on government. Freedom to George means less government help and more reliance on self, family and neighbors:
Perhaps I am being too hard on George. There is actually much in this speech that could be inspiring if it came from another speaker. But given that it is George, I can't help being concerned that the lofty rhetoric hides an altogether violent and nefarious agenda.
Reading didn't help. In fact, if anything, the transcript seems more disjointed and far less eloquent than the speech itself did. And I have come away from the reading as confused as ever. Even -- or perhaps especially -- in print, it is just all so damn vague.
In part, of course, the speech is a craven effort to portray vice as virtue. Nowhere does he mention Iraq. Yet there is little doubt that Iraq is what he is talking about when he says this:
Today, I also speak anew to my fellow citizens: From all of you, I have asked patience in the hard task of securing America, which you have granted in good measure. Our country has accepted obligations that are difficult to fulfill, and would be dishonorable to abandon. Yet because we have acted in the great liberating tradition of this nation, tens of millions have achieved their freedom. And as hope kindles hope, millions more will find it. By our efforts, we have lit a fire as well, a fire in the minds of men. It warms those who feel its power, it burns those who fight its progress, and one day this untamed fire of freedom will reach the darkest corners of our world.Gone completely is the notion that we invaded Iraq to forestall the imminent threat posed by Saddam Hussein's WMDs and his support of Al Queda. The real purpose George tells us was to light a fire of freedom that will bring an end to tyranny throughout the world. Excuse me while I throw up.
But there's more to the speech than self-justification. In addition to "explaining" our noble purposes in Iraq, George is also articulating (if that is the word) a vision, a theme, that will undergird his entire second term both domestically and internationally. If it were anyone but George Bush, I wouldn't take this effort too seriously. But one thing we have learned about George is that he believes this kind of rhetoric and that he does what he's says he'll do. So, anyone interested in where the country will be going in the next four years is well advised to at least try to figure out what it is he is saying.
That's hard, though. The theme, obviously, is the "expansion of freedom". I didn't count them, but William Safire, who not surprisingly loved the speech ("I rate it among the top 5 of the 20 second-inaugurals in our history"), says Bush used the words "freedom", "free" and "liberty" 49 times. While I do not question the accuracy of that count, I must say that it feels low. These words appear so frequently that the speech begins to sound like a chant: Freedom! Freedom! Freedom! Freedom!
But what exactly does George mean by freedom? And what steps does he intend to take in pursuit of the goal of expanding it both abroad and at home?
On the international side, I think the speech is really content-free. Perhaps intentionally, it allows the reader to see in it whatever the reader chooses to see and discloses nothing about what the speaker's true intentions are. If there is "meat" here it appears to be this:
So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.Supporting democratic movements and opposing tyranny have always been at least the nominal policies of the United States. So, at a literal level at least, the speech promises nothing new. Yet, you can't help but think that George really does have something new in mind. But, beyond some sweeping generalization about standing by the oppressed and standing up to the oppressors -- sentiments that themselves are hardly new -- he doesn't say what that is. The rhetoric is great; the content non-existent. Perhaps that is inevitable, even appropriate, in an Inaugural Address. In this case, though, I suspect there is intention behind the rhetoric. And, given the speaker, my inability to divine that intention makes me nervous.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the speech is that George thinks we need to "expand freedom" domestically as well. Silly me, I thought maybe he was going to advocate repeal of the USA Patriot Act. But no, it's not freedom from government oversight and prying that George wants to expand; it's freedom from reliance on government. Freedom to George means less government help and more reliance on self, family and neighbors:
In America's ideal of freedom, citizens find the dignity and security of economic independence . . . . By making every citizen an agent of his or her own destiny, we will give our fellow Americans greater freedom from want and fear, and make our society more prosperous and just and equal. In America's ideal of freedom, the public interest depends on private character, on integrity and tolerance toward others, and the rule of conscience in our own lives. Self-government relies, in the end, on the governing of the self. . . . In America's ideal of freedom, the exercise of rights is ennobled by service, and mercy and a heart for the weak. Liberty for all does not mean independence from one another. Our nation relies on men and women who look after a neighbor and surround the lost with love.I can't argue too much with the literal meaning of these sentiments. Freedom does require one to take responsibility for himself rather than expecting the government to assume that responsibility. Yet, I can't help thinking that what George is really saying is that, in the name of freedom, we -- or the government at least -- will be getting out of the business of helping even those for whom self-reliance is simply not possible.
Perhaps I am being too hard on George. There is actually much in this speech that could be inspiring if it came from another speaker. But given that it is George, I can't help being concerned that the lofty rhetoric hides an altogether violent and nefarious agenda.
9 Justices split 5 to 5!
There are nine Justices on the Supreme Court. An official "Opinion of the Court" requires the concurrence of five of them. Given that, it is hard to imagine how there could be two "Opinions of the Court" in the same case. Well, it happened last week in UNITED STATES v. BOOKER. The trick: Justice Ginsburg joined in both opinions.
Freddie Booker was convicted by a jury of possession of 92.5 grams of crack cocaine. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, the maximum sentence for possession of 92.5 grams of crack was 262 months. However, at sentencing, the Judge found that Freddie also had another 566 grams of crack, although evidence of this additional (or larger) stash was never presented to the jury. Applying the sentencing guideline to this larger stash resulted in an actual sentence of 360 months. Freddy appealed arguing that tacking an extra 10 years on to his sentence based on facts found by the judge (using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard) rather than by a jury (using a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard) violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
Five of the Justices (Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg) agreed, so the first "Opinion of the Court" held that it was constitutionally impermissible for Congress to require a judge to impose a sentence outside the range authorized by the Guidelines for the facts found by the jury.
The other four Justices (Breyer, Rhenquist, Kennedy and O'Connor) disagreed strongly. Yet, rather than simply taking their medicine and writing their dissents, they sought to make an end run around the ruling by "excising" the statutory provisions making the guidelines mandatory. They were sucessful in doing this becuase Justice Ginsburg joined in this opinion as well. The immediate effect of this ruling is to make the Guidelines purely advisory. The real effect, though, is to allow trial courts to do exactly what the majority held they could not be required to do consistent with the Sixth Amendment: consider "facts" not found by the jury in determining a sentence. As explained by Justice Breyer:
I do not have any big problem with this outcome, since I have never been a big fan of determinate sentencing. But, the process by which this outcome was reached -- and particularly Justice Ginsburg's role in it -- seems more than a bit bizarre.
Freddie Booker was convicted by a jury of possession of 92.5 grams of crack cocaine. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, the maximum sentence for possession of 92.5 grams of crack was 262 months. However, at sentencing, the Judge found that Freddie also had another 566 grams of crack, although evidence of this additional (or larger) stash was never presented to the jury. Applying the sentencing guideline to this larger stash resulted in an actual sentence of 360 months. Freddy appealed arguing that tacking an extra 10 years on to his sentence based on facts found by the judge (using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard) rather than by a jury (using a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard) violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
Five of the Justices (Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg) agreed, so the first "Opinion of the Court" held that it was constitutionally impermissible for Congress to require a judge to impose a sentence outside the range authorized by the Guidelines for the facts found by the jury.
The other four Justices (Breyer, Rhenquist, Kennedy and O'Connor) disagreed strongly. Yet, rather than simply taking their medicine and writing their dissents, they sought to make an end run around the ruling by "excising" the statutory provisions making the guidelines mandatory. They were sucessful in doing this becuase Justice Ginsburg joined in this opinion as well. The immediate effect of this ruling is to make the Guidelines purely advisory. The real effect, though, is to allow trial courts to do exactly what the majority held they could not be required to do consistent with the Sixth Amendment: consider "facts" not found by the jury in determining a sentence. As explained by Justice Breyer:
[Since the Court has now held that the Guidelines as written violate the Sixth Amendment], we must determine which of the two following remedial approaches is the more compatible with the legislature's intent as embodied in the 1984 Sentencing Act. . . . One approach, that of Justice Stevens'. . ., would change the Guidelines by preventing the sentencing court from increasing a sentence on the basis of a fact that the jury did not find (or that the offender did not admit). The other approach, which we now adopt, would . . . make the Guidelines system advisory while maintaining a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender's real conduct.It is plain from the rest of the opinion that the "real conduct" Breyer wants the court to consider in Freddie Booker's case is the fact that he actually had 655 grams of crack rather than 92.5 grams as presented to the jury. In short, a majority of the Justices held that it violated the Sixth Amendment for Congress to require a trial court to consider facts not presented to the jury but a majority of the Justices also held but it did not violate the Sixth Amendment to allow -- even encourage -- the trial court to consider those exact same facts. Justice Ginsburg is the only Justice to agree with both of these holdings. Yet she writes not a word of explanation.
I do not have any big problem with this outcome, since I have never been a big fan of determinate sentencing. But, the process by which this outcome was reached -- and particularly Justice Ginsburg's role in it -- seems more than a bit bizarre.
Thursday, January 20, 2005
Should Liberals Give Up On Litigation?
Two posts by Nathan Newman on January 13 and January 14 triggered an interesting debate on whether litigation is counterproductive in terms of advancing a "progressive" social agenda.
The first of these posts was a comment on the Georgia case challenging stickers inserted by the school board into biology textbooks noting that "evolution is a theory, not a fact" and suggesting the material on evolution "should be approached with an open mind, studied carefully and critically considered." Nathan is no fan of "intelligent design," yet he wondered (sensibly, I think) what was terrible enough about these stickers warrant a lawsuit:
This in turn triggered a somewhat sharper objection from Kevin:
Is litigation counter-productive? I am surprised that no one mentioned what would seem to be the poster-child for this argument: the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision on gay marriage. This decision precipitated a dozen or more state constitutional “marriage amendments”, some of which appear to ban even civil unions, which were not previously all that controversial, and contributed significantly to the reelection of George Bush. Talk about counter-productive! Maybe Nathan is right.
But, then, there’s Brown v Board of Education. This decision too sparked a violent backlash. Yet, one would be hard pressed to argue that it was counter-productive in terms of segregation in particular and civil rights in general. Roe v. Wade is a decision that cuts both ways. Yes, as Nathan argues, the backlash triggered by this decision was counter-productive for progressives in that it contributed significantly to both the rise of the Christian Right and the marginalization of social progressives. Yet, one can hardly call it counter-productive in terms of a woman’s right to choose or, indeed, in terms of women’s rights generally.
What this tells me is that litigation is a mixed bag. But, then, so too is legislative action, which is Nathan’s preferred method for effecting social change. He argues (more or less) that legislation is less likely to produce a counter-productive backlash because the opponents of legislation will see the process as more democratic and therefore see the outcome as more legitimate and harder to oppose once enacted. This is an appealing notion, but I don’t think it’s right.
Take the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act for example. Lest we forget, these legislative acts produced enormous opposition, especially, though not exclusively, in the South. And, this backlash in turn contributed significantly to the formation of the Republican “solid South” that was critical to the election of Nixon, Reagan and now Bush. In short, progressive legislation is no less likely than progressive judicial decisions to produce a backlash that is counter-productive to furtherance of a progressive agenda.
The point here is that it is not the process of law-making that causes backlash; it is the outcome. Legalization of abortion by legislation would have been no less controversial and no less inimical to longer-term progressive agendas that Roe v. Wade was. The same is true of gun-control, gay marriage, prayer-in-school, evolution, affirmative action, and virtually any other “hot button” issue you can name. People may rant about the process, but what they care about is the result.
In terms of the propensity to generate backlash, therefore, I don’t think there is much difference between judicial and political law-making. However, judicial action does have two advantages over the political process which recommend it to progressives or, indeed, to anyone interested in changing the status quo: it is faster and, more important, it is undemocratic. In a democracy, the status quo is, almost by definition, that state of affairs with which the majority of the people are currently comfortable. As a result, changing the status quo via the political/legislative process is a long, hard road. Witness the history of the Equal Rights Amendment. By contrast, precisely because it is undemocratic, judicial action can change the status quo literally overnight. Indeed it is this power to change things suddenly that drives “conservatives” (who, generally at least, are interested in maintaining the status quo) so crazy.
Judicial action changes the status quo in two ways. First, of course, there is the holding itself. Roe v. Wade made abortion legal in all 50 states, literally at the stroke of a pen. Second, and more important, judicial action forces people to think about issues that they previously ignored – and to think about them in new ways. This power to effect a paradigm shift in public thinking is perhaps the most important aspect of judicial action. Yes, as decisions like Brown, or Roe, or the Massachusetts gay marriage decision galvanizes opponents. But they also galvanize supporters. And, even more important, they force the great majority of people to think about issues that otherwise would never have intruded on their consciousnesses in any meaningful way.
Again, I think Brown is a case in point. Prior to Brown, most Americans probably gave little thought to segregation, and, when they did, most probably thought of it as being primarily an issue of freedom of association; i.e. people ought to be able to decide with whom their kids went to school. I might think they are making a mistake in their choice to maintain segregated schools, but I will defend their right to make that choice.
Brown changed all of that. First, it forced people to think about segregation. Second, it forced people to recognize that there was more at stake than freedom of association. It is that paradigm shift, much more that the specific holding of the case, that is its principal legacy. Legislation, by contrast has no power to do this. Indeed, a paradigm shift is what makes legislation possible, not vice versa.
(By the way, I have some hope that the Massachusetts gay marriage case will end up effecting a similar paradigm shift with regard to gay rights. One of the remarkable things about groundbreaking judicial decisions is their staying power. Karl Rove and his marriage amendments seem to have carried the day for the moment. But, it is early in this game, and I have a great deal of confidence in the basic good sense of the American people in the long run. Sure, they can be stampeded into doing stupid things. But, if our history proves anything, I think, it is that, in the end, we come to our senses. It’s trite, of course, but still Lincoln was right: you can fool all of the people some of the time, but you can’t fool all of them – or even most of them -- all of the time).
So, should progressives abandon litigation. Certainly not. Should they rely exclusively on litigation? Certainly not. There is a feedback loop here. Judicial decisions contribute to paradigm shifts that eventually make advances through the political process possible. This, in turn, opens doors for additional judicial action. Neither politics nor litigation is the complete answer: the two feed upon and affect each other. But both, it seems to me, are essential.
In closing, I want to offer the perspective of age. When Nixon resigned, there were a lot of people who speculated that it would be generatiuons before another Republican was elected President. As it turned out, it only took four years. Things change. This too will pass.
The first of these posts was a comment on the Georgia case challenging stickers inserted by the school board into biology textbooks noting that "evolution is a theory, not a fact" and suggesting the material on evolution "should be approached with an open mind, studied carefully and critically considered." Nathan is no fan of "intelligent design," yet he wondered (sensibly, I think) what was terrible enough about these stickers warrant a lawsuit:
Is it that horrific that students are told to keep an "open mind"?He then went on to question why liberals were so obsessed with this issue:
The liberal struggle to include information about evolution in text books is a worthy one, but the reality is that many citizens have a deeply felt conviction that it's false and an affront to their religious beliefs. A sticker that de facto reminds students of the existence of those deeply held beliefs and requests that they approach the material carefully is not an establishment of any one religion, or even religion over non-religion.
Frankly-- and I'll be writing more about this -- I think progressives should stop fighting so hard against the teaching of "intelligent design" in schools. I think it's horsecrap science but I don't think the courts are the venue for debating the nature of scientific truth.True to his word, he did write more the next day, only this time he took a somewhat broader focus arguing that litigation was generally counterproductive because of the backlash created by judicial activism. He used the prayer-in-schools cases as an example:
The reality is that forty years after the Supreme Court began eliminating prayer in schools and banning creation-science from the classroom, religious conservatism is more dominant in our public culture than when the Supreme Court first acted. And I don't think those two facts are unrelated.This elicited a response from Kevin Drum. Kevin agreed that some of the litigation being brought on church-state issues "just feeds the religious right's feeling of righteous besiegement while gaining almost nothing in practical terms.Who really cares if Roy Moore plops a Ten Commandments monument in front of his courthouse?" However, he concludes by chiding Nathan a bit for being unrealistic:
Secularism increased in strength democratically in the United States throughout this century until the 1960s. But the Supreme Court decisions on religion and then abortion became a populist rallying cry for the building of the religious right in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Instead of having to rhetorically attack their fellow citizens for secular changes in law, the religious right could blame these legal changes on a malevolent "elite", centered in the Supreme Court, that was attacking their way of life.
And liberals increasingly play into the Right's caricature of them as elitists by reflexively defending court decisions over democracy.
Still, even though I feel that way personally, someone is going to take this kind of stuff to court. There's just no way to stop it. And if I were a judge, what choice would I have then? The damn thing is pretty clearly unconstitutional whether it offends me personally or not. Ditto for Intelligent Design, which any honest judge would conclude after only cursory research is nothing more than creationism with a pretty face.Nathan followed up with both a more detailed exposition of his argument and a response to Kevin's point on the practicalities.
In the end, then, even though I agree with Nathan that some of the fringe issues being litigated today are probably counterproductive for liberals (though I'm less sure I agree with him about some of the core rulings of the 60s), I'm still not sure where this leaves us. What's the next step?
This in turn triggered a somewhat sharper objection from Kevin:
The distinction here is this: creationism is Christian proselytizing, a no-no for government bureaucrats. ... Does this position run the risk of infuriating Christian fundamentalists and provoking a backlash? Of course it does. It already has. And yet I find myself unconvinced that that's sufficient reason to back down on this. ... Even if Nathan is right, that's a bridge I just can't cross.Matt Yglesias then came to Nathan's defense (at least in part):
Dependence on the courts makes liberals fat and lazy. Important political fights are won on the airwaves, on the op-ed pages, in the streets, and at the ballot box. The "culture wars" fights are largely winnable, but only if you play the game and learn to play it well. Thus I find myself in strong sympathy with Nathan Newman's last point on the subject (more mixed feelings about his other arguments).Scott Lemieux and Julie Saltman then weighed in defense of litigation as a tool, to which Matt responded as follows.
Julie thinks liberals should pursue all available strategies. In principle, I don't disagree. But the point under dispute is whether or not, in practice, a habit of relying on lawsuits to win our battles for us tends to sap energy out of progressive politics and render liberals lazy. My contention is "yes." As Julie observers, our side is worse at "outreach, PR and mass education" than it should be? My contention is that this fact is not unrelated to the habit of trying to win things through the courts. It seems to me that gays and lesbians have done less than they might to put forward the substantive, moral argument for why they should be allowed equal married rights with heterosexual couples in part because of the attention being paid to legal battles. It seems to me that advocates of teaching evolution in public schools do a less good job than they could of explaining why they think this is important and why you should want your kids to learn proper science, in part because we tend to believe that the courts will always bail us out if the wingnuts get out of hand.There's more here and here, but the foregoing is enough of a background for what I have to say.
Is litigation counter-productive? I am surprised that no one mentioned what would seem to be the poster-child for this argument: the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision on gay marriage. This decision precipitated a dozen or more state constitutional “marriage amendments”, some of which appear to ban even civil unions, which were not previously all that controversial, and contributed significantly to the reelection of George Bush. Talk about counter-productive! Maybe Nathan is right.
But, then, there’s Brown v Board of Education. This decision too sparked a violent backlash. Yet, one would be hard pressed to argue that it was counter-productive in terms of segregation in particular and civil rights in general. Roe v. Wade is a decision that cuts both ways. Yes, as Nathan argues, the backlash triggered by this decision was counter-productive for progressives in that it contributed significantly to both the rise of the Christian Right and the marginalization of social progressives. Yet, one can hardly call it counter-productive in terms of a woman’s right to choose or, indeed, in terms of women’s rights generally.
What this tells me is that litigation is a mixed bag. But, then, so too is legislative action, which is Nathan’s preferred method for effecting social change. He argues (more or less) that legislation is less likely to produce a counter-productive backlash because the opponents of legislation will see the process as more democratic and therefore see the outcome as more legitimate and harder to oppose once enacted. This is an appealing notion, but I don’t think it’s right.
Take the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act for example. Lest we forget, these legislative acts produced enormous opposition, especially, though not exclusively, in the South. And, this backlash in turn contributed significantly to the formation of the Republican “solid South” that was critical to the election of Nixon, Reagan and now Bush. In short, progressive legislation is no less likely than progressive judicial decisions to produce a backlash that is counter-productive to furtherance of a progressive agenda.
The point here is that it is not the process of law-making that causes backlash; it is the outcome. Legalization of abortion by legislation would have been no less controversial and no less inimical to longer-term progressive agendas that Roe v. Wade was. The same is true of gun-control, gay marriage, prayer-in-school, evolution, affirmative action, and virtually any other “hot button” issue you can name. People may rant about the process, but what they care about is the result.
In terms of the propensity to generate backlash, therefore, I don’t think there is much difference between judicial and political law-making. However, judicial action does have two advantages over the political process which recommend it to progressives or, indeed, to anyone interested in changing the status quo: it is faster and, more important, it is undemocratic. In a democracy, the status quo is, almost by definition, that state of affairs with which the majority of the people are currently comfortable. As a result, changing the status quo via the political/legislative process is a long, hard road. Witness the history of the Equal Rights Amendment. By contrast, precisely because it is undemocratic, judicial action can change the status quo literally overnight. Indeed it is this power to change things suddenly that drives “conservatives” (who, generally at least, are interested in maintaining the status quo) so crazy.
Judicial action changes the status quo in two ways. First, of course, there is the holding itself. Roe v. Wade made abortion legal in all 50 states, literally at the stroke of a pen. Second, and more important, judicial action forces people to think about issues that they previously ignored – and to think about them in new ways. This power to effect a paradigm shift in public thinking is perhaps the most important aspect of judicial action. Yes, as decisions like Brown, or Roe, or the Massachusetts gay marriage decision galvanizes opponents. But they also galvanize supporters. And, even more important, they force the great majority of people to think about issues that otherwise would never have intruded on their consciousnesses in any meaningful way.
Again, I think Brown is a case in point. Prior to Brown, most Americans probably gave little thought to segregation, and, when they did, most probably thought of it as being primarily an issue of freedom of association; i.e. people ought to be able to decide with whom their kids went to school. I might think they are making a mistake in their choice to maintain segregated schools, but I will defend their right to make that choice.
Brown changed all of that. First, it forced people to think about segregation. Second, it forced people to recognize that there was more at stake than freedom of association. It is that paradigm shift, much more that the specific holding of the case, that is its principal legacy. Legislation, by contrast has no power to do this. Indeed, a paradigm shift is what makes legislation possible, not vice versa.
(By the way, I have some hope that the Massachusetts gay marriage case will end up effecting a similar paradigm shift with regard to gay rights. One of the remarkable things about groundbreaking judicial decisions is their staying power. Karl Rove and his marriage amendments seem to have carried the day for the moment. But, it is early in this game, and I have a great deal of confidence in the basic good sense of the American people in the long run. Sure, they can be stampeded into doing stupid things. But, if our history proves anything, I think, it is that, in the end, we come to our senses. It’s trite, of course, but still Lincoln was right: you can fool all of the people some of the time, but you can’t fool all of them – or even most of them -- all of the time).
So, should progressives abandon litigation. Certainly not. Should they rely exclusively on litigation? Certainly not. There is a feedback loop here. Judicial decisions contribute to paradigm shifts that eventually make advances through the political process possible. This, in turn, opens doors for additional judicial action. Neither politics nor litigation is the complete answer: the two feed upon and affect each other. But both, it seems to me, are essential.
In closing, I want to offer the perspective of age. When Nixon resigned, there were a lot of people who speculated that it would be generatiuons before another Republican was elected President. As it turned out, it only took four years. Things change. This too will pass.
Thursday, January 06, 2005
The Palestinian Point Of View
An "advertiser's link" on the NYT Web site led me recently to this slide show prepared by the "American Task Force on Palestine" . It is an interesting -- and for the most part fairly balanced -- presentation on the merits of the "two-state solution" to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As such, I think it is well worth reviewing regardless of your preconceptions about this conflict. However, in the end, it falls short (perhaps well short) of being the "non-partisan" exposition it purports to be. To me, that is disappointing, because this failure makes it possible to dismiss an otherwise good piece of work as just so much Palestinian propaganda.
The problems start with this map, which defines "Palestine" that as that part of the British Mandate lying west of the Jordan River. What this eventually enables the authors to do is to argue that the Palestinian State they propose (comprised what is now known as the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem) would amount to only 22% of "historic Palestine". In fact, though, the original British Mandate included not just the area west of the Jordan, but the area east of it as well -- i.e. the land that now comprises the country of Jordan. Palestinians comprised a significant majority of the population in that area and that area can, with considerable justification, also be classified as a part of "historic Palestine." As readers of the "debates with Yuval" posted below will know, many or at least some Israelis take the position that, in computing the percentage of "Palestine" allocated between Jews and Palestinians, the eastern part of the British Mandate must also be considered. In this view, then, creating another Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza further compounds the original injustice of giving all of what is now Jordan to the Palestinians.
I do not take sides in this debate. Frankly, in terms of what is feasible today, it could not matter less what the borders of "historic Palestine" were -- even if it were possible to delineate those borders with precision. The point here is simply this: a presentation purporting to be non-partisan has to recognize the existence of this alternative view of history.
The more serious problems with the presentation arise in connection with what the presentation describes as the "challenges" to the two-state solution. Certainly the issues identified -- Israeli settlements, the Israeli barrier, the Bush letter to Sharon recognizing that it would be "unrealistic" to return completely to the 1967 boundaries, and violence by both sides against civilians -- all do pose significant challenges to further progress. But, there are a number of other challenges that go unmentioned and the treatment of the issue of violence against civilians fails to recognize, much less try to address, the widespread perception -- especially within the American audience that is its primary target -- that Palestinian violence against Israel is a fundamentally different from Israeli violence against Palestinians.
Taking the violence issue first, I agree that labeling Palestinian violence against civilians as "terrorism" while calling Israeli counter-violence self-defense is not helpful. Yet, it seems to me that there are two differences that need to be acknowledged by supporters of the Palestinians. First, Israeli violence is, for the most part, responsive. That is, if Palestinian violence ceased, then it seems clear that at least overt Israeli violence would also cease. Second, while civilians are certainly victims of Israeli violence, they are not, generally at least, consciously and explicitly targeted. To me, these distinctions do not make much of a difference. This is a war of resistance, and, as with any such, the stronger party can afford to be largely reactive because it is seeking to preserve rather than change the status quo. And, the weaker party targets civilians because those are, quite literally, the only targets it has. Because of the enormous asymmetry in military power (in deed in power of all types) abandoning attacks on civilians would be to effectively abandon the resistance altogether. In the end, the ATFP is right to condemn the violence of both parties equally. However, if its message is to be effective with respect to its target audience it must directly acknowledge and address the differences that exist.
The most serious defects in the presentation relate to the challenges that are not identified. Perhaps the most important of these is what is politely (and euphemisitcally) referred to as "incitement": the vitriolic, racial hatred of Jews and calls for their extermination (as a sacred requirement no less) that spews forth nearly daily from mosques, schools, the Palestinian media and even the Palestinian leadership. (If you doubt the tone, intensity or the ubiquity of these polemics, spend some time cruising around this site -- bit be prepared to be sickened. If this sort of blatant hate speech is not a "challenge" to what ATFP claims is their goal, then it is hard to imagine what might be. Yet this challenge is not even mentioned.
A second omission is the failure of the various organizations purporting to represent the Palestinian people to amend their founding documents. See, e.g.,The Palestinian National Charter 1968 and Hamas Covenant 1988. These documents deny even the existence of Israel and reject categorically any compromise with it. Rather, they maintain that "The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal," that "Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism, ... is racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist, and colonial in its aims, and fascist in its methods," that "Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and the geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity, and progress," that "Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine" and that the Palestinian people "reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine [and] all proposals aiming at the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, or its internationalization." Is this not also a "challenge" to progress toward a two-state solution?
A third omission is the ineptness and corruption of the Palestinian leadership. Has ever a leadership talked more and delivered less for its people?
And a fourth, though probably not final, omission is the perfidy of other Arab governments. Has ever a people been so badly treated by those who claim to be its friends and even champions?
I do not mean by all of this to be overly critical of the presentation. To the contrary, as I said at the outset, there is a lot to recommend it to anyone interested in hearing a somewhat more reasoned exposition of the Palestinian views on an ultimate solution to the problem. But it is, perhaps inevitably biased by its de-emphasis the challenges being posed to progress by the Palestinians, and more generally the Arabs.
The problems start with this map, which defines "Palestine" that as that part of the British Mandate lying west of the Jordan River. What this eventually enables the authors to do is to argue that the Palestinian State they propose (comprised what is now known as the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem) would amount to only 22% of "historic Palestine". In fact, though, the original British Mandate included not just the area west of the Jordan, but the area east of it as well -- i.e. the land that now comprises the country of Jordan. Palestinians comprised a significant majority of the population in that area and that area can, with considerable justification, also be classified as a part of "historic Palestine." As readers of the "debates with Yuval" posted below will know, many or at least some Israelis take the position that, in computing the percentage of "Palestine" allocated between Jews and Palestinians, the eastern part of the British Mandate must also be considered. In this view, then, creating another Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza further compounds the original injustice of giving all of what is now Jordan to the Palestinians.
I do not take sides in this debate. Frankly, in terms of what is feasible today, it could not matter less what the borders of "historic Palestine" were -- even if it were possible to delineate those borders with precision. The point here is simply this: a presentation purporting to be non-partisan has to recognize the existence of this alternative view of history.
The more serious problems with the presentation arise in connection with what the presentation describes as the "challenges" to the two-state solution. Certainly the issues identified -- Israeli settlements, the Israeli barrier, the Bush letter to Sharon recognizing that it would be "unrealistic" to return completely to the 1967 boundaries, and violence by both sides against civilians -- all do pose significant challenges to further progress. But, there are a number of other challenges that go unmentioned and the treatment of the issue of violence against civilians fails to recognize, much less try to address, the widespread perception -- especially within the American audience that is its primary target -- that Palestinian violence against Israel is a fundamentally different from Israeli violence against Palestinians.
Taking the violence issue first, I agree that labeling Palestinian violence against civilians as "terrorism" while calling Israeli counter-violence self-defense is not helpful. Yet, it seems to me that there are two differences that need to be acknowledged by supporters of the Palestinians. First, Israeli violence is, for the most part, responsive. That is, if Palestinian violence ceased, then it seems clear that at least overt Israeli violence would also cease. Second, while civilians are certainly victims of Israeli violence, they are not, generally at least, consciously and explicitly targeted. To me, these distinctions do not make much of a difference. This is a war of resistance, and, as with any such, the stronger party can afford to be largely reactive because it is seeking to preserve rather than change the status quo. And, the weaker party targets civilians because those are, quite literally, the only targets it has. Because of the enormous asymmetry in military power (in deed in power of all types) abandoning attacks on civilians would be to effectively abandon the resistance altogether. In the end, the ATFP is right to condemn the violence of both parties equally. However, if its message is to be effective with respect to its target audience it must directly acknowledge and address the differences that exist.
The most serious defects in the presentation relate to the challenges that are not identified. Perhaps the most important of these is what is politely (and euphemisitcally) referred to as "incitement": the vitriolic, racial hatred of Jews and calls for their extermination (as a sacred requirement no less) that spews forth nearly daily from mosques, schools, the Palestinian media and even the Palestinian leadership. (If you doubt the tone, intensity or the ubiquity of these polemics, spend some time cruising around this site -- bit be prepared to be sickened. If this sort of blatant hate speech is not a "challenge" to what ATFP claims is their goal, then it is hard to imagine what might be. Yet this challenge is not even mentioned.
A second omission is the failure of the various organizations purporting to represent the Palestinian people to amend their founding documents. See, e.g.,The Palestinian National Charter 1968 and Hamas Covenant 1988. These documents deny even the existence of Israel and reject categorically any compromise with it. Rather, they maintain that "The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal," that "Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism, ... is racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist, and colonial in its aims, and fascist in its methods," that "Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and the geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity, and progress," that "Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine" and that the Palestinian people "reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine [and] all proposals aiming at the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, or its internationalization." Is this not also a "challenge" to progress toward a two-state solution?
A third omission is the ineptness and corruption of the Palestinian leadership. Has ever a leadership talked more and delivered less for its people?
And a fourth, though probably not final, omission is the perfidy of other Arab governments. Has ever a people been so badly treated by those who claim to be its friends and even champions?
I do not mean by all of this to be overly critical of the presentation. To the contrary, as I said at the outset, there is a lot to recommend it to anyone interested in hearing a somewhat more reasoned exposition of the Palestinian views on an ultimate solution to the problem. But it is, perhaps inevitably biased by its de-emphasis the challenges being posed to progress by the Palestinians, and more generally the Arabs.
Prejudice Triumphs in Eastchester NY
This from the NY Times today -- "Town Rescinds Health Benefits for Partners" -- is so sad. The rationale:
"This is a real victory," Raymond W. Belair, a lawyer with Family First, a local group that opposed the policy, said yesterday....This was always about the gay lobby chipping away to get to marriage," Mr. Belair said. "And right now there is nothing more important than preserving marriage."I wonder if this applies as well to unmarried heterosexual couples. But, regardless, someone really needs to explain to me how providing health insurance, pension rights, etc, to unmarried couples threatens marriage -- or how depriving unmarried couples of those benefits preserves it.
Tuesday, January 04, 2005
Aging Populations
To the many in my (very small) audience who believe that the European model of social benefits is the "right" way to do things, read this from David Brooks. His points are also germane to the issues discussed below around social security.
I am not saying I agree with Brooks -- especially his smugness, in the last two paragraphs, about how the Right has saved America. But I do think he is at least talking about the real issue.
I am not saying I agree with Brooks -- especially his smugness, in the last two paragraphs, about how the Right has saved America. But I do think he is at least talking about the real issue.
Social Security and The Left
Paul Krugman and the NYT Editorial Page have now joined the chorus of those, mostly on the left it seems (see, e.g. Kevin Drum and his commenters), who have discovered that the social security "crisis" is a myth created by George Bush to distract us from other "real" problems.
Excuse me, but the public's belief that there is a problem with social security was not created by George Bush. He is using it, of course. But he did not create it. In fact, the people now saying the problem is a myth had a lot to do with creating the "myth" in the first place (if that is what it is).
Another irony in this debate lies in the fact that the criticism of the social security "crisis" is to some extent rooted in a "belief" that Bush is underestimating the growth rate of the American economy over the next four decades. Yet these are the same people who so readily criticize Bush for overly optimistic estimates of the growth rate when it comes to his claims that increases in tax receipts as a result of increasing growth will pare the deficit despite the Bush tax cuts. No doubt Bush is using different growth projections for different purposes. But, it seems, his adversaries are doing much the same thing.
A third irony is that confidence in the current status of social security is premised on the assumption that the government will pay off the bonds held in the social security trust fund once expenditures begin to exceed receipts (in 10-20 years, depending on which growth projections one uses). Yet the these same people bemoan the effect on the economy of having to pay off exactly the same kinds of debts today.
The fact of the matter is that neither side is being straight about any of this. Rather, both sides are using the "fear factor" to score what amount to political points on each other over the issue of privatization. Bush probably is exaggerating the extent of the crisis in order to "sell" partial privitization. On the other hand, his critics are almost certainly downplaying the extent of the problems in order to defeat it.
But, shouldn't we be debating privitization on it's own merits? In this regard I ask myself, where do we want to end up in, say 50 years? Do we want a system where we force people to save for their own retirements? Or do we want a system where we force people to pay the retirement benefits of their parents? In the abstract, at least, the latter seems clearly preferable. If that's the case, then the questions we ought to be debating is whether can we get there and how could we do it? You don't here much of that from the Left right now, though. They're too busy denying that there is a problem.
But, there is a problem. Maybe it's not the problem that the Bushies are trumpeting. Maybe it is not, as Krugman argues, the only or even the biggest problem. But it seems silly to deny that there is a problem.
Here is what I think is true about social security. For the next 10-20 years, social security tax receipts will exceed benefits paid by some margin, with both the extent and duration of the surplus depending on what happens to real GDP growth and longevity of retirees. Nobody seems terribly worried about this phase of this process. But, it is important to keep in mind that even here there is a significant cost: by forcing current wage earners to pay benefits for current retirees we are limiting -- in many cases eliminating -- the ability of current wage earners to save for their own retirements. After this surplus phase, benefits paid will exceed receipts by some margin (assuming no changes in benefits or eligibility), with both the magnitude and duration of the shortfall again being dependent on future real GDP growth and longevity of retirees. At this point, the social security administration will begin to redeem the US government bonds accumulated in the social security trust fund during the years of surplus. I agree with Krugman that it is unlikely the government will default on that debt. But, having said that, the hard question is where will it get the money to pay those debts? It can only come from one of four places: increasing taxes; refinancing the debt (i.e. borrowing from other investors to pay social security benefits); printing more money; or cutting benefits (in order to slow the pace at which the debt to social security has to be re-paid). The burdens of the last two of these options (reduced benefits and the inflationary impact of printing more money) would fall primarily on the then-current retirees. The burdens of the first two (increased taxes and increased on-budget national debt) would fall on then-current wage-earners, limiting even further their ability to save for their own retirement. In short, I think the left is in denial (or is at least allowing political antipathy to anything Bush to blind it to the obvious): within a relatively short time (i.e. 10-20 years) social security will precipitate a crisis. No, it is not a crisis of bankruptcy. But it is a crisis of huge unfunded debt by the federal government.
So, where does privitization fit into this? Will it "save" social security? Of course not. Social security, considered alone, does not need saving, at least not any time soon. Will it avoid the crisis of unfunded federal debt? No. In fact, in the near term, it will accelerate it by accelerating both the date at which social security trust fund redemptions will begin and the rate at which the trust fund will be exhausted. But, what it will begin to do is to break the cycle of relying on current wage-earners to pay benefits to current retirees and thereby limiting or even eliminating their ability to save for their own retirement. And that, it seems to me, would be a very, very good thing.
What is the right answer? Should we endure the status quo despite its long-term problems because fundamental change is too hard, too expensive in the near term? Or should we begin to transition to a better, fairer and more stable system despite the pain that will come from that transition? I don't know. But I wish we could have the debate on those terms, rather than arguing about whether or not the social security system is "in crisis."
Excuse me, but the public's belief that there is a problem with social security was not created by George Bush. He is using it, of course. But he did not create it. In fact, the people now saying the problem is a myth had a lot to do with creating the "myth" in the first place (if that is what it is).
Another irony in this debate lies in the fact that the criticism of the social security "crisis" is to some extent rooted in a "belief" that Bush is underestimating the growth rate of the American economy over the next four decades. Yet these are the same people who so readily criticize Bush for overly optimistic estimates of the growth rate when it comes to his claims that increases in tax receipts as a result of increasing growth will pare the deficit despite the Bush tax cuts. No doubt Bush is using different growth projections for different purposes. But, it seems, his adversaries are doing much the same thing.
A third irony is that confidence in the current status of social security is premised on the assumption that the government will pay off the bonds held in the social security trust fund once expenditures begin to exceed receipts (in 10-20 years, depending on which growth projections one uses). Yet the these same people bemoan the effect on the economy of having to pay off exactly the same kinds of debts today.
The fact of the matter is that neither side is being straight about any of this. Rather, both sides are using the "fear factor" to score what amount to political points on each other over the issue of privatization. Bush probably is exaggerating the extent of the crisis in order to "sell" partial privitization. On the other hand, his critics are almost certainly downplaying the extent of the problems in order to defeat it.
But, shouldn't we be debating privitization on it's own merits? In this regard I ask myself, where do we want to end up in, say 50 years? Do we want a system where we force people to save for their own retirements? Or do we want a system where we force people to pay the retirement benefits of their parents? In the abstract, at least, the latter seems clearly preferable. If that's the case, then the questions we ought to be debating is whether can we get there and how could we do it? You don't here much of that from the Left right now, though. They're too busy denying that there is a problem.
But, there is a problem. Maybe it's not the problem that the Bushies are trumpeting. Maybe it is not, as Krugman argues, the only or even the biggest problem. But it seems silly to deny that there is a problem.
Here is what I think is true about social security. For the next 10-20 years, social security tax receipts will exceed benefits paid by some margin, with both the extent and duration of the surplus depending on what happens to real GDP growth and longevity of retirees. Nobody seems terribly worried about this phase of this process. But, it is important to keep in mind that even here there is a significant cost: by forcing current wage earners to pay benefits for current retirees we are limiting -- in many cases eliminating -- the ability of current wage earners to save for their own retirements. After this surplus phase, benefits paid will exceed receipts by some margin (assuming no changes in benefits or eligibility), with both the magnitude and duration of the shortfall again being dependent on future real GDP growth and longevity of retirees. At this point, the social security administration will begin to redeem the US government bonds accumulated in the social security trust fund during the years of surplus. I agree with Krugman that it is unlikely the government will default on that debt. But, having said that, the hard question is where will it get the money to pay those debts? It can only come from one of four places: increasing taxes; refinancing the debt (i.e. borrowing from other investors to pay social security benefits); printing more money; or cutting benefits (in order to slow the pace at which the debt to social security has to be re-paid). The burdens of the last two of these options (reduced benefits and the inflationary impact of printing more money) would fall primarily on the then-current retirees. The burdens of the first two (increased taxes and increased on-budget national debt) would fall on then-current wage-earners, limiting even further their ability to save for their own retirement. In short, I think the left is in denial (or is at least allowing political antipathy to anything Bush to blind it to the obvious): within a relatively short time (i.e. 10-20 years) social security will precipitate a crisis. No, it is not a crisis of bankruptcy. But it is a crisis of huge unfunded debt by the federal government.
So, where does privitization fit into this? Will it "save" social security? Of course not. Social security, considered alone, does not need saving, at least not any time soon. Will it avoid the crisis of unfunded federal debt? No. In fact, in the near term, it will accelerate it by accelerating both the date at which social security trust fund redemptions will begin and the rate at which the trust fund will be exhausted. But, what it will begin to do is to break the cycle of relying on current wage-earners to pay benefits to current retirees and thereby limiting or even eliminating their ability to save for their own retirement. And that, it seems to me, would be a very, very good thing.
What is the right answer? Should we endure the status quo despite its long-term problems because fundamental change is too hard, too expensive in the near term? Or should we begin to transition to a better, fairer and more stable system despite the pain that will come from that transition? I don't know. But I wish we could have the debate on those terms, rather than arguing about whether or not the social security system is "in crisis."
Saturday, January 01, 2005
The Last Post on the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict For A While. I Promise
I had intended to move on after getting Linda's note below. But, Rob Vincent perservered -- and proved me wrong yet again: you can have a civil discussion of these issues, even with someone passionately commited to Israel and passionately skeptical of the Arabs. So, in the interests of fairness, and in the interests of publishing a sane voice, here perhaps is a better stopping place. (Even if you do not read all of this, be sure to look at the videos linked in the last message from Rob. They give you some sense of why supporters of Israel are so suspect of the prospects for peace with the Palestinians)
From Rob (12/31/04):
From Rob (12/31/04):
Bill,From Bill (12/31/04):
I'll try to be brief (for once, though that is a skill that I have not yet mastered).
First, I'd ask you to re-read what I wrote you originally. Carefully. I actually don't advocate that Israel hangs onto Judea/Samaria entirely, or even mostly. Yuval and I are friends and we agree on much, but I offer a somewhat different solution than he does It is a solution that is outside of the various options you offer as possible solutions, though it is close to one of them. Addressing that one in particular, you say "Jordan doesn't want it back." Well, the monarchy doesn't want it back because it makes the case for ethnic Palestinian majority rule that much stronger, and his (the King's) legitimacy that much weaker. I doubt that you can make the statement that "Jordan doesn't want it back" with any assurance with respect to the general population of Jordan.
Second, we really don't have any reliable information, in the form of accurate polling data, what the Palestinian people in the West Bank want or expect with respect to Israel. We do know that they teach their schoolchildren that Israel as a Jewish state is evil and doesn't deserve to exist. We know that their clerics and the leaders of most of the various terrorist factions - still far from being brought under the control of the PA - preach the total destruction of the "Zionist entity". I could go on with many other examples, but Yuval has, I think, done a very good job of making this case for me, which is that there is practically no objective evidence out there to suggest that the Palestinian leaders would ever sincerely accept a final settlement that left them with "merely" the West Bank, or even the West Bank plus Gaza, and along with this, that they would really sincerely resolve on their own part to live in peace with Israel from that point onwards. There is all sorts of evidence that they mean to go for the whole nine yards, so to speak, if not right away, then at some future point when they are strong enough to think that they can. Their leaders have made this point very clear on many occasions and many contexts. And as I pointed out to you earlier, it isn't just the "extremists" who say this. Even prominent white-collar professionals, local leaders within their own community right here in Toledo, would obviously support them in this, based on what they have told our community leaders right to their faces.
Once they have a state, with all that entails, if there is not a complete and fundamental change in what they have demonstrated thus far as leaders and as a society, they do thus pose a larger problem for Israel than they do today. They can make treaties. They can build an army. And if their own economy can't support the latter (which it probably couldn't), I'm very certain that they would get all sorts of help in that regard from Saudi Arabia, Iran, etc. And then, when Israel inevitably has to "un-ring" that bell, as you put it, they have to pay a much bigger price. Not just in defeating this army to get at the terrorists, but also likely in terms of a larger Arab-Israeli war. Israel would probably win this fight (if it didn't escalate to WMDs), but at what cost? You say there is mostly upsides and no practical downsides to your scenario. Now consider the scenario I just laid out. Add Iran's ballistic missiles and nuke capability to this a few years down the road if nothing effective is done about that. You really believe this?
So why should Israel be pressured into making a deal with leaders she clearly cannot trust, who have proven time and again that they cannot be trusted, to buy a temporary peace that sets the stage for a much bigger bloodbath down the road? That is the main point that I am making here, that I'm sure Yuval would be in complete agreement with, and that I think many Israelis and Jews generally would also agree with. That is not to say that there are not a sizable number of Jews who may agree with you; many Jews are so tired of the current conflict that they are getting desperate for anything that even smells like peace. I can understand that. Many Europeans were so desperate for peace following the cataclysm of WW1 that they would go to practically any length to appease Hitler. Obviously, that doesn't mean that their judgment was sound. Clearly, events proved in hindsight that it wasn't.
And with the above in mind, I sure don't want to live to see the day that you, or anyone who espouses what you believe, looks back on the smoking irradiated ruins of Israel or the Middle East generally, or even into the eyes of the thousands of Jewish families that have lost loved ones in another major Middle Eastern war, and hear you say "Oh my, I guess I was wrong. We shouldn't have trusted Abbas."
Now, addressing your response to what you interpreted as my main point.....I can only say that you missed my point. Without going into a rehashing of my whole argument (again, I recommend a careful re-reading), my point is that the Arabs' often and loudly professed ire over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is their "excuse", and a poor one at that, for their own failures. Why should we lend credence to their lie by behaving as though this is a sincere and justifiable grievance on their part? Without reform and modernization of their societies, or at least united pressure from the developed world that recognizes this as the central problem (not Israel), there just isn't going to be peace between Israel and the Arabs, or the Arab world and the West. And where Israel as a specific issue is concerned, the Arabs today are a very long way from accepting them at all. Indeed, I submit to you that precisely because of the internal dynamics of their polities that I described earlier, the Arabs simply cannot accept Israel. What difference can a temporary flawed "peace" agreement between the PA and Israel, giving the PA the West Bank, make in this dynamic? Bill, how much longer does Israel have to bleed to prove this to you? How many more Jews have to die before what has been made obvious by the events of the past 60 years is obvious to you?
Now, I'm not living in fantasy land, and I can see that Israel bleeds even today. I don't support the status quo. I at least agree with you that a solution must be found. And I mapped out what I believe is a reasonable and fair solution in my last communication with you. But, in the same practical terms that you say is your starting point, I'd rather that Israel bleed a little today, defending herself from a position of relative strength, than buy a temporary respite that practically guarantees that she bleeds a heck of a lot more later. Israel must stand fast and defend herself resolutely until the Arabs generally and the Palestinians in particular (and this must happen together) are really ready for participating in a just and lasting peace. And we must support her in this (and by "we", I'm not just referring to the U.S., but the developed secular first-world democracies as a community).
OK, you can't trust me either (to be brief, that is). But again, I'd ask you to carefully review what I wrote you earlier and tell me whatever is wrong with what I suggest as a solution. And/or, what is wrong with my appreciation of the real roots of this conflict, and if I am not wrong about that, how handing the West Bank over to the likes of Abbas and his cronies in the PA is going to contribute anything constructive to solving these problems in a substantial and lasting way.
Sincerely (and Happy New Year),
-Rob Vincent
Rob -- Thank you for not being brief. And for restoring a measure of civility.From Rob(1/1/05):
I will confess -- as your correctly surmised -- that I did not read your original message with the attention it deserved; in fact, I sort of skimmed it. Chalk it up to my being discouraged, frustrated and a bit angry. But I have read the second message with some care, and I find a lot of common ground there and a lot to think about.
Is the incitement against Israel in the PA really as bad as what you (and Linda) describe? It's hard for me to fathom that. There are always whackos in any society who preach hatred -- we certainly have our share in this country, and my guess is that there are some in Israel as well. But my sense is that, in most societies, these types of people are a tiny minority who, though loud, do not speak for the vast majority. My personal experience tells me that most people are pretty sane, rational and tolerant. Therefore, my "belief" that most Palestinians no longer wanted to destroy Israel was based at least in part on an assumption that the same was probably true of the Palestinians as well. While it is not hard at all to imagine individuals who harbor such hatred, it is very hard for me to imagine that an entire people do. But, what you are saying, I guess, is that that is exactly the case here. I still find that hard to believe, but I guess I have to concede that I could be wrong.
Rather than giving you a litany of all the things you say that I either agree with or that I at least acknowledge could well be right, let me jump to what I gather is your bottom line in all of this: But, in the same practical terms that you say is your starting point, I'd rather that Israel bleed a little today, defending herself from a position of relative strength, than buy a temporary respite that practically guarantees that she bleeds a heck of a lot more later.
If the premises of this statement are true; i.e. if it is true that the creation of a Palestinian State would be only a temporary respite and would practically guarantee that Israel bleeds a lot more later, then I can hardly argue with you conclusion. The issue, obviously, is the premises. I tend to be more hopeful on both of these scores than you are, but I have to admit that I could be wrong. And, you are right of course, that the consequences of being wrong could be terrible. However, the costs of doing nothing are already pretty bad and could get much worse. That's the dilemma. We can't afford to do nothing and we can't afford to do the wrong thing either.
As you recognize, a way has to be found to bring this conflict to a close. At some point, this is going to require an act of faith by Israel. At what point -- under what circumstances -- would you be willing to see Israel make that leap?
I have two concerns about your proposed solution -- assuming I understand it. The first is practical. If a way can be found to peacefully re-incorporate the West Bank and its population back into Jordan, I am all in favor of it. But, it seems to me that this outcome would actually be worse from the standpoint of Israeli security than a separate Palestinian state on the West Bank. Presumably, incorporation of the West Bank Palestinians into Jordan would not bring to an end their animosity toward Israel. So, are you are presuming that the Jordanian Palestinians (and other Jordanians) do not share than antipathy and would be willing and able to control the West Bank Palestinians? If so, I am curious why you believe that? And, if you are wrong on that, wouldn't an enlarged Jordan pose a much more formidable threat to Israel than a separate state confined to the West Bank?
The other concern relates to the Arab governments generally. Yes, I agree absolutely that the Arab governments are a HUGE part of the problem. But I am not sure whether we agree or disagree on the implications of that fact. You seem to imply that regime change in these countries (particularly Jordan) is a precondition for a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians. But I for one am not prepared to invade every (or indeed any other) country in the middle east to achieve that. Remember, my goal here is to improve relations with the Arab world, not to make them even worse. Yet, short of armed intervention, I see little reason to hope for meaningful change in those governments in my lifetime. Are you suggesting that there is no point in pursuing a resolution of the Palestinian issue until the Arab governments have evolved into liberal democracies? If so, then I disagree. I think Israel is going to have to take her "leap of faith" long before that happens.
(BTW: I have never said -- and do not believe -- that Israel is the problem. The problem is the conflict. But Israel certainly does have a role to play in bringing that conflict to an end. As do the Palestinians. But I am not speaking to them right now.
Thanks for your note. It really has given me a lot to think about. It was exactly in the hope of having a conversation like this that I embarked on this effort in the first place.
Bill
Bill,From Bill (1/1/05):
Thank you for your gracious reply.
A couple of points, one a little on the lengthy side, the rest, brief.
On the issue of moderates among the Arabs generally and Palestinians in particular:
Most people are people. We all pretty much want the same things: a comfortable, secure place to live, agreeable employment, good families, etc. I have not traveled widely, but my academic pursuits and military service have brought me into contact with many different people from around the world, including Arabs, and I would agree that bloody-minded, 'line-them-up-against-the-wall-and-shoot-them' haters are a comparatively rare breed.
That having been said, we also know that at least at the onset, most Germans did not support Hitler. It is a commonly held myth that he was elected, but he wasn't. When he ran for Chancellor in 1932, his party got 40% of the vote. That obviously means that 60% of the Germans at that time were not Nazis. We don't know to what extent the Japanese people honestly supported their leaders at a comparable point in history. But we do know the war these two nations launched, the dogged determination exhibited by both of these countries, and the horrific crimes they committed. The "fatherland" says it's "OK", propaganda whips people up, and there seems to be no limit to the depths of depravity that people will go. A very said fact about the human animal.
Now, when children are raised from a very young age to hate Jews and Israel, when clerics constantly preach hatred against Jews and Israel, when political leaders of very influential violent factions such as Hamas say again and again that they will continue to fight until the "Zionist entity" is no more, I think it is not hard to determine what to expect. My bottom line here is that maybe, hypothetically, a mini-state in the West Bank for the Palestinians might work if their political culture were something like that of other mini-states, such as Luxembourg or Andorra, but obviously, that is not the case. I don't think I'm being unreasonably pessimistic here.
Before I leave this subject, I would ask you to carefully think trough the implications of the very fact, that I've mentioned before, that neither the PA, nor all of the other Arab governments save Jordan and Egypt, have even recognized Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state (and even this is not a concession that a great many Jordanians and Egyptians readily make).
How could we have ever negotiated an end to the Cold War with the Russians if they didn't even recognize our right to exist, for example? Even at the height of the Cold War, when we were poised to annihilate each other on twenty minutes notice, we still at least had diplomatic relations.
Isn't this the most elemental requirement of any process that would lead towards peace? It doesn't require any final agreement on borders, Jerusalem, settlers, etc. It just means that an elemental fact that the rest of the world outside of the Arab-Moslem world, 130+ countries, has no problem with, is also recognized by the Arabs: that the Jews deserve a country. How hard is that? No, I don't say that there can only be peace when the rest of the Arab world evolves into Jeffersonian democracies. But I don't think asking for diplomatic recognition as a simple starting point is asking so much....but apparently, they do. Now do you see why I'm so pessimistic about them?
Now, onto my brief points:
In my plan, the West Bank confederates with Jordan, but as a demilitarized zone. Thus, there is a DMZ buffer between Israel and "Palestine" (i.e., Jordan). If Jordan subsequently introduces troops into the area or supports terrorists, that is justification for Israel to intervene. But, since the Palestinians could now call all of Jordan their home, if they provoked Israel into re-occupying the West Bank, they could no longer claim that Israel deprived them of a country. I think this arrangement would take an awful lot of wind out of the sails of the terrorists, especially in the eyes of world opinion, which is vital to them.
Second, I do not advocate violent regime change in Jordan. I don't think that would be necessary. Jordan already has a parliament, and broadly speaking, they have arguably moved farther down the path of developing a democracy than any other Arab state. I'm not talking about "off with their heads"; I'm talking about a dignified retirement for the royals. I'm talking about reforms that would leave them looking like the U.K., the Netherlands, Norway, etc. The monarchy keeps its palaces, but loses its power. I'm talking about persuading Jordan to make these reforms by peaceful means, economic/political carrots and sticks. (For example, nobody had to invade S. Africa for there to be majority rule in that country.) There just has to be a recognition on the part of the world community generally, and the developed secular democracies in particular, that the real onus for satisfying Palestinian national aspirations lies on Jordan's shoulders, not Israel's.
And following from this latter point, I'm glad you don't consider Israel to be "the problem". Unfortunately, the Arab-Moslem community generally, loudly, incessantly, says this. And by dint of repetition, combined with a 60's mindset on the part of a lot of Western journalists and academics that unquestioningly and automatically sides with who they perceive (or more properly in this case, are led to believe) are "oppressed third-world peoples taken advantage of by evil white-guy colonialists", a lot of self-described "progressives" also take up this cry. Most distressingly, even some Jews engage in this sort of self-flagellation, apparently believing that maintaining their "progressive" bona-fides leaves them with no other choice.
As a side point, it is astounding to me that any true progressive would ever take up the Arab cause against Israel. From the standpoint of any "progressive" parameter that you could name - religious freedom, human rights, political rights, freedom of the press, women's rights - Israel is light years ahead of any Arab country. Most Western progressives would simply be creamed if they had to live in Arab society (especially the women). Yet, to so many of them, Israel is the "bad guy". It just blows my mind. And FYI, this isn't some Rush Limbaugh conservative talking. I voted for Gore in 2000, Kerry in 2004, and on most domestic policy issues I'm decidedly to the left of center. That makes this phenomenon all the more galling to me.
Hope I've further clarified my positions to you.
Happy New Year,
-Rob Vincent
Rob –From Rob (1/1/05):
I had intended to let the Palestinian issue rest for a day, but I am watching Georgia stomp on Wisconsin (to whom I am currently paying obscene amounts of tuition) and it got so bad I needed something to distract me. So, blame John Stocco (the UW QB) for the fact that you have still more mail on this in your in box.
I couldn’t agree more on the recognition issue. It does not come through in this thread because I am talking to supporters of Israel here, but I have more than a few problems with the Arabs and the Palestinians. And their stupid posturing on recognition is certainly one of them. But, one thing you said surprised me. I thought that the PA/PLO did recognize Israel’s right to exist and subscribe to UNR 242 as a part of the Oslo accords. Maybe you think – as I think Yuval does – that this is a sham. But, if diplomatic legalities are important, don’t you at least have formal recognition from the Palestinians? And, it seems pretty clear than you could get the same from Syria and Lebanon if you could ever get a peace treaty with Syria.
But to be honest, I am not sure why these diplomatic legalities are that important to Israel. Trust me, all of these guys “recognize” that Israel exists: it’s very hard anyone, even for an Arab, to deny the reality of someone who has kicked the shit out of him half a dozen times. The Arabs seem to have this need to strut around and talk tough – they are SUCH drama queens. Partly of course this is compensation for the fact that they are so pathetically weak and ineffective. But isn’t it just childish posturing that any adult should see through – and ignore? Does it really mean anything?
I do know something about the history of Germany between the wars. (I’ll be damned if I will say “the H word” again, though. ;-) Funny how frequently we all find ourselves referring to that history in connection with these issues. In all sorts of ways, it is a “looming omnipresence”). And, yes you are right. Organized minorities can, and repeatedly have, taken countries in directions that the majority would have rejected if asked. Think, among others, of the Bolsheviks. So yes, the fact that the fire-breathers are a minority does not mean that they can be ignored. In fact, that very thought is why I speculated that incorporating the West Bank Palestinians into Jordan might well be worse in terms of the threat to Israel’s security. Isn’t there some danger that if they are really as committed as you think they would end up taking over Jordan and turning it back into an enemy? And, that same thought is also why I am very skeptical that Jordan itself will ever agree to it. Nobody wants these people in their country. That is one of the things that makes their situation so damn pathetic.
Don’t mistake me. I am not committed to a Palestinian State on the West Bank. All I am committed to is an end of the conflict. And, I can see no path to that goal that does not involve an end to the statelessness of the West Bank Palestinians. If a Jordanian confederation is the best way to do this, and if it can be implemented peacefully, then I am all for it. But, I must say that if I were Israel and I believed that the hatred of Israel is as deeply ingrained in these people as you do, I would much prefer to have them “quarantined” in a small, weak mini-state on the West Bank, surrounded on three side by Israel with a stable and friendly (or at least non-hostile) Jordan at their backs, than run the risk of having them do to Jordan what they did to Lebanon.
I don’t know what to do about the hate mongering you describe. It is soooo sad. But is it possible, just possible, that it is not as bad as it seems? Iraq provides an example of what I am talking about. Believe it or not there is actually a lot of good being done in Iraq, especially in the North and South. Whether it is enough to overcome the evil remains to be seen. But you never, ever hear anything about the good being done. All you see and hear are the acts of barbarism and the rhetoric of hatred. Is it possible that our perceptions of the Palestinians are colored by the same type of phenomenon? If we agree that “that bloody-minded, 'line-them-up-against-the-wall-and-shoot-them' haters are a comparatively rare breed” isn’t it possible that our perceptions of the depth and breadth of Palestinian hatred are overblown by the fact that evidence to the contrary is just not “newsworthy”?
My guess is you will say, “Sure, it’s possible, but Israel cannot afford to take the chance that the haters are a minority and that the “reasonable majority” (assuming it exists) will be able to control the new state.” I guess, in the end, that is where we diverge. I believe Israel cannot afford not to take that chance. And, I believe the West cannot afford to refrain from pressing her to do so and, at the same time, doing all it possibly can to assure that her fears are not realized once she does.
Thanks so much for bearing with me – and for being able to talk dispassionately about things about which your feelings are obviously very deep.
Oh, and a very a Happy New Year to you and yours.
Wisconsin has lost, so it’s on the Iowa-LSU, then Michigan-Texas to see if the Big Ten can win at least one game today.
Bill
Bill,From Bill (1/1/05):
Linda Olmert passed this along to me. Thought you'd find it educational.
Video 1, Video 2, Video 3, Video 4, Video 5, Video 6
-Rob
Rob --
Hadn't seen these [the videos linked above] when I sent my last note.
On behalf of humanity, let me apologize. No one should have to listen to stuff like this ever. And the Jews have been listening to it for what, 2000 years? It's disgusting and pathetic.
I don't know what to say about this in relation to what we have been talking about. The fact that they talk this way -- where does it lead you (other than to the bathroom to throw up)? That Peace is impossible?
Here's something Yuval wrote that sticks in my head: "Israel needs only one sort of courage, to continue its fight and prevail until she defeats all her enemies. Until they bag her to stop. Until they prove that they really really really mean peace this time." Is that really the answer? Doesn't she really need the courage to ignore this kind of talk? I don't know. This kind of hatred so depresses me.
Bill
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